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  In 1984, the United States Supreme Court held in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza that the exclusionary rule does not ordinarily apply to respondents 
in immigration proceedings. However, the Court suggested that its opinion 
about the applicability of the exclusionary rule might change if 
constitutional violations by immigration officers became a widespread 
problem. First, this Article proposes that constitutional violations by 
immigration officers have become both geographically and institutionally 
widespread in the years since Lopez-Mendoza. Second, this Article argues 
that immigration law and the practice of immigration enforcement have 
changed fundamentally in the twenty-five years since Lopez-Mendoza was 
decided, undermining the assumptions on which the majority in 1984 based 
its arguments against the use of the exclusionary rule. This Article 
concludes that, in the modern context, remaining faithful to Lopez-Mendoza 
requires the reintroduction of the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule’s value 
might change, if there developed good reason to believe that 
Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were 
widespread.1 
 
On January 6, 1984, the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court met in conference to decide whether to grant certiorari in INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza,2 an immigration case recently decided by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held 
that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents violated Adan 
Lopez-Mendoza’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the rights of another 
similarly situated plaintiff, Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, in the course of 
their immigration arrests, and therefore any evidence that the agents 
had gathered as a result of those unconstitutional arrests should be 
excluded from proceedings in accordance with the exclusionary rule.3 
The INS petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding should be reversed because the exclusionary rule—a 
fundamental procedural protection in the criminal context that, prior to 
the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in In re 
 
 1. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
 2. 705 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 3. Id. at 1061. In criminal proceedings in both state and federal courts, the 
exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment for the purpose of proving a defendant’s guilt. See Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) 
(ruling that illegal evidence gathered by state officers cannot be used against defendants 
in federal court). The exclusionary rule similarly applies to Fifth Amendment violations 
in state and federal courts. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897). It 
also applies to Sixth Amendment violations. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201, 206–07 (1964) (excluding statements because they were deliberately elicited in 
violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel). Should such illegally 
obtained evidence be improperly admitted at trial, the trial court’s finding of guilt must 
be reversed on appeal, unless the prosecution can prove that the error was harmless. 
See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23–24 (1967). 
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Sandoval 4 in 1979, also applied in immigration proceedings5—should 
not be applied in the immigration context.6 As the Justices gathered to 
decide whether to take the case, Justice Harry Blackmun suggested that, 
because of “the small number of . . . suppression claims that were 
raised” in immigration proceedings, the Court should not grant 
certiorari.7 In support of his argument, Justice Blackmun pointed out 
that from 1952–79 (during which the exclusionary rule had applied in 
deportation proceedings), fewer than fifty Fourth Amendment 
challenges to the introduction of evidence had been raised, which 
suggested that constitutional violations by INS officers did not 
constitute a widespread problem with which the Court should concern 
itself.8 
Despite Justice Blackmun’s reservations, certiorari was granted.9 
The Court eventually ruled in favor of the INS, with Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor writing a five-part opinion for the 5-4 majority10 in 
which Justice Blackmun was the crucial fifth vote.11 Parts I–IV of the 
Lopez-Mendoza opinion lay out the grounds for the majority’s decision 
that the exclusionary rule need not ordinarily apply in immigration 
proceedings.12 However, Part V of the opinion13 lists three 
circumstances in which the Court believed the application of the 
 
 4.  17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1059 (White, J., dissenting) (“The 
simple fact is that prior to 1979 the exclusionary rule was available in civil deportation 
proceedings, and there is no indication that it significantly interfered with the ability of 
the INS to function.”). 
 7. Justice Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes, at 9 (handwritten) Jan. 6, 
1984, 407/83-491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 8. See id.; see also Lopez-Mendoza, 705 F.2d at 1071 (describing how, 
prior to the decision of the BIA in In re Sandoval, neither the BIA nor any court had 
held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in civil deportation proceedings, and 
observing that the Board in In re Sandoval noted that there were “fewer than fifty” BIA 
proceedings since 1952 in which motions had been made to suppress evidence on 
Fourth Amendment grounds). In re Sandoval was one of the two BIA cases that were 
consolidated into INS v. Lopez-Mendoza. In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 
1979). 
 9. Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 464 U.S. 1037 (1984). 
 10. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034. 
 11.  See infra note 59. 
 12. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034–50. 
 13. Chief Justice Burger did not join Part V of the opinion, see id. at 1033, 
but it can still arguably be considered a “majority” opinion as, effectively, an 8-1 
majority of members on the Court supported the idea of applying the exclusionary rule 
under these circumstances—the four out of five who joined that part of Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion, and the four dissenters who already thought that use of the 
exclusionary rule was justified. See id. 
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exclusionary rule would be justified in an immigration context: first 
(echoing the concerns previously expressed by Justice Blackmun), if 
there was “good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by 
INS officers were widespread”;14 second, if evidence against an 
immigration respondent was obtained as a result of egregious 
constitutional violations that were fundamentally unfair;15 and third, if 
evidence was obtained as a result of constitutional violations that 
undermined the reliability of the evidence.16 
The Lopez-Mendoza holding has shaped immigration procedure 
for over two decades, controlling the admission or suppression of 
evidence in all immigration proceedings before Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR) judges,17 the BIA Appeals,18 and federal 
courts of appeal across the country.19 In many immigration 
proceedings, suppression and termination20 are the only potential forms 
of relief available to a respondent. A motion to suppress evidence and 
terminate proceedings is therefore often not merely a procedural step, 
but rather the single determinative factor deciding whether an individual 
 
 14. Id. at 1050. 
 15.  Id. at 1050–51. 
 16. Id. 
 17. The EOIR is the administrative court in which immigration respondents 
are tried. There are fifty-six immigration courthouses in the United States. See 
USDOJ.gov, United States Department of Justice Executive Office of Immigration 
Review, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir (last visited Dec. 2, 2008). EOIR decisions, which 
are typically unpublished, are appealable to the BIA. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., In re Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 380 (BIA 1986); In re 
Benitez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 173, 175 (BIA 1984). 
 19. See, e.g., Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 
2006); Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2002); Orhorhaghe v. 
INS, 38 F.3d 488, 503–04 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 20. In immigration proceedings, motions to suppress evidence and terminate 
proceedings may be filed by respondents who allege that immigration officials have 
committed constitutional and/or regulatory violations. Motions to suppress evidence 
may be filed in cases of alleged constitutional violations. Once such a motion has been 
granted, evidence obtained pursuant to the constitutional violation is excluded from the 
proceeding, and in the absence of further independently obtained evidence, a motion to 
terminate proceedings may be granted. Motions to terminate proceedings also may be 
brought by respondents alleging regulatory violations by immigration officials. Once 
such a motion is granted, proceedings are terminated. Termination of proceedings does 
not alter an individual’s immigration status, but rather restores that individual to the 
situation that he or she was in prior to the arrest by immigration authorities. For a 
detailed account of the use of suppression and termination motions in immigration 
proceedings see IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK (11th ed. 
2008). 
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is removed from the United States or allowed to remain in the 
country.21 
Immigration case law since 1984 clearly demonstrates the extent to 
which the BIA and the federal circuits continue to adhere to the guiding 
principles of Lopez-Mendoza, particularly when ruling on motions to 
suppress evidence and terminate proceedings. In recent years, the 
growing body of case law applying Part V of Lopez-Mendoza has 
garnered particular attention from jurists, activists and scholars, as 
different circuits have developed differing interpretations of the Lopez-
Mendoza doctrine.22 Courts of appeal have largely ignored the first, 
“widespread violation” prong of Part V of the Lopez-Mendoza 
holding,23 and have instead devoted considerable attention to the last 
two prongs of Part V, producing careful and detailed analyses of what 
might constitute an “egregious constitutional violation,”24 what might 
render that violation “fundamentally unfair,”25 and what might 
meaningfully “undermine the reliability of evidence.”26 As a result, a 
 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, 
FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK REVIEW, at D2 (2008) [hereinafter EOIR FY 2007 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy07syb.pdf 
(showing the disposition of immigration cases for the years 2003–07 and the availability 
of different forms of relief). 
 22. See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228–30 (4th Cir. 
2007); Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 234–35; United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 
430–31 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1111–12 
(10th Cir. 2006); Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2004); 
Miguel v. INS, 359 F.3d 408, 411 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2004); Martinez-Camargo, 282 F.3d 
at 492–93; United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 753–55 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 459, 460 (5th Cir. 1997); Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d 
at 501–03. 
 23. An exception to this general rule is a recent United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit case. See Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 46–47 
& n.6 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 24. See, e.g., Daniel P. Blank, Suppressing Defendant’s Identity and Other 
Strategies for Defending Against a Charge of Illegal Reentry After Deportation, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 139, 161–62 (1997) (arguing that there is a firm distinction between 
conduct which is merely unlawful and that which reaches the “egregious” threshold); 
see also Jonathan L. Hafetz, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 
Reconsidered, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 843, 860–61 (1998) (arguing that, based on Ninth 
Circuit precedent, any arrest based on “racial appearance or [a] foreign sounding name 
is egregious”).  
 25. See, e.g., Judy C. Wong, Note, Egregious Fourth Amendment Violations 
and the Use of the Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Hearings: The Need for 
Substantive Equal Protection Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 28 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 431, 455–60 (1997) (summarizing lower court decisions finding that an 
immigration stop based exclusively on race was an egregious Fourth Amendment 
violation justifying the application of exclusionary rule). 
 26. See, e.g., Stephen C. Covell, Comment, Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS: 
Possible New Conditions for the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Deportation Proceedings, 9 
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body of immigration case law has gradually evolved wherein motions to 
suppress evidence and terminate removal proceedings27 have been 
granted because of egregious constitutional and regulatory violations by 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents.28 
Courts ruling on suppression and termination motions consistently 
follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Lopez-Mendoza.29 In that spirit, 
this Article proposes that courts should revisit the first ground for 
suppression articulated by the Lopez-Mendoza majority: the existence 
of widespread constitutional or regulatory violations by immigration 
officers. This Article first demonstrates that considerations of whether 
Fourth Amendment violations by immigration officers were widespread 
deeply informed every step of the Court’s handling of the Lopez-
Mendoza case, from Justice Blackmun’s initial inclination to deny 
certiorari through Justice O’Connor’s final opinion. The Article then 
demonstrates that such violations are significantly more common today 
than they were twenty-five years ago and argues that for sound legal 
and policy reasons, keeping faith with Lopez-Mendoza may now 
require the reintroduction of the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings. 
Part I of this Article demonstrates the great significance of the 
widespread-violation issue to the Lopez-Mendoza majority. Using 
unpublished materials from the Blackmun archives, the Article traces 
the ways in which individual Justices’ beliefs that violations of 
immigration respondents’ constitutional rights were not widespread 
profoundly influenced the Lopez-Mendoza holding. Rereading the text 
of Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in conjunction with Justice 
Blackmun’s records, as well as case law from the years immediately 
following the Lopez-Mendoza decision, the Article argues that three 
foundational beliefs underpinned the majority’s opinion that 
constitutional violations by INS officers were unlikely to pose a 
widespread problem—a belief that immigration proceedings were 
 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 855, 860 (1995) (discussing Ninth Circuit jurisprudence redefining 
what evidence may be of probative value). 
 27. Deportation proceedings are now frequently referred to as removal 
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1229 (2006) (using the term removal to include the 
deportation of noncitizens from the interior). 
  28. See, e.g., In re Rabani, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, at 
17–19 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Oct. 3, 2007) 
(on file with author); In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration 
Judge (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review July 10, 2003) 
(on file with author). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 584–87 (6th Cir. 
2005); Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1997); Gonzalez-Rivera v. 
INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448–52 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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“purely civil” rather than criminal in nature,30 a belief that INS’s own 
rules and regulations would sufficiently deter officers from committing 
constitutional violations,31 and a belief that adequate civil remedies 
were available to redress any wrongs that immigration respondents may 
have suffered.32 
Part II explores the extent to which there has, nonetheless, been a 
marked increase in the number of allegations of violations of 
immigration respondents’ constitutional rights in the twenty-five years 
since Lopez-Mendoza. Drawing upon federal court cases, BIA 
holdings, complaints filed in immigration courts, testimony given to 
congressional hearings, and reports in the popular press, this Part 
examines the extent to which these constitutional violations cross 
geographical and institutional boundaries—that is, the extent to which 
these violations have become widespread.33 This Part further argues 
that such violations have become so widespread that, in order to remain 
faithful to the Court’s argument in Lopez-Mendoza, the exclusionary 
rule should now be reintroduced in immigration proceedings. 
Part III of this Article considers arguments against the 
reintroduction of the exclusionary rule currently advanced by scholars 
and government lawyers. Such arguments continue to be founded on the 
Lopez-Mendoza majority’s reasoning when they first held that the 
exclusionary rule need not apply; the civil or administrative nature of 
removal proceedings, the efficacy of ICE’s internal training, and the 
availability of alternative forms of relief. This Part also proposes that 
these arguments have been rendered increasingly irrelevant by 
developments in immigration and criminal law, changes in the practices 
of the INS (and its successor ICE), and the evolving realities of life for 
immigrant communities. In 2009, quarter-century-old arguments against 
the reintroduction of the exclusionary rule appear outdated and 
ultimately unpersuasive. 
This Article concludes that, because so much has changed in the 
twenty-five years since Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the same 
principles of fundamental fairness and concern for the rule of law that 
animated the Lopez-Mendoza majority’s widespread-violation exception 
in 1984 now counsel the reintroduction of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings. 
 
 30. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 1044–45. 
 32. Id. at 1045. 
  33. Part II of the Article also introduces recent case law from the Second 
Circuit that recognizes the potential validity of a widespread-violations claim. See 
Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 46–47 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2008); Pinto-Montoya v. 
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 130 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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I. 1984: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE WIDESPREAD-VIOLATIONS 
EXCEPTIONS IN INS V. LOPEZ-MENDOZA 
A. The Majority Opinion and the Role of the  
Widespread-Violations Exception 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza 
appears, on first reading, to be straightforward. The holding proceeds 
from the premise that the exclusionary rule is not a personal 
constitutional right, but rather a judicially created remedy designed to 
deter constitutional violations by law-enforcement officers.34 As a 
consequence, it is appropriate to use a balancing test to determine 
whether the rule’s value in deterring illegal searches and seizures 
outweighs the societal costs of its application.35 Parts I–IV of the 
majority opinion carefully apply this balancing test.36 On one side of the 
scale, five principal reasons render the exclusionary rule of limited use 
in deportation proceedings,37 and on the other side of the scale, the 
societal costs of applying the rule in deportation proceedings may be 
high for four reasons.38 Weighing these considerations led the Court to 
 
 34. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042 (“The exclusionary rule provides 
no remedy for completed wrongs; those lawfully in this country can be interested in its 
application only insofar as it may serve as an effective deterrent to future INS 
misconduct.”); see also U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).  
 35. This test was developed by the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
433, 453–54 (1976). 
 36. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042. 
 37. The first of these principle is that “[a] deportation proceeding is a purely 
civil action . . . ” Id. at 1038. The second is that “[t]he ‘body’ or identity of . . . [the] 
respondent . . . is never itself suppressible,” and even if an arrest is illegal, “evidence 
not derived directly from the arrest is sufficient” to uphold deportation. Id. at 1039, 
1043. The third is that few aliens arrested request deportation hearings, and even 
“few[er] challenge the circumstances of their arrests,” so an “arresting officer is most 
unlikely to shape his conduct in anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal 
deportation hearing.” Id. at 1044. The fourth is that the INS has its own rules and 
regulations that “require that no one be detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal 
alienage, and that no one be arrested unless there is an admission of illegal alienage or 
other strong evidence thereof.” Id. at 1044–45. The final principle is that the 
immigration enforcement is the provenance of a single agency under central federal 
control and engaged in repetitive operations, and thus declaratory relief is a possible 
remedy for respondents whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. Id. at 
1045 (“The possibility of declaratory relief against the agency thus offers a means for 
challenging the validity of INS practices, when standing requirements for bringing such 
an action can be met). 
 38. The first cost is that an undocumented alien’s continuing presence in the 
United States constitutes a crime. Id. at 1047 & n.3 (noting that the exclusion rule does 
not sanction continuing violations of the law, and the release of undocumented 
respondents from detention as a result of the application of the exclusionary rule 
“would clearly frustrate the express public policy against an alien’s unregistered 
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conclude that the costs outweighed the benefits, and therefore the 
exclusionary rule need not apply when immigration respondents’ 
constitutional rights are violated.39 
Part V, however, complicates the Lopez-Mendoza holding. Part 
V, as discussed earlier, sets forth three contexts in which the Court 
explains it would revisit its decision to preclude the use of the 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings—widespread violations of 
the Fourth Amendment, egregious violations that are fundamentally 
unfair, or violations of the Fourth Amendment that undermine the 
probative value of the evidence immigration agents have obtained.40 
Scholars have debated the significance of Part V of the Lopez-Mendoza 
holding and its interrelationship with Parts I–IV, attempting to gain 
insight into the majority’s reasoning; this shared focus has not, 
however, led to consensus. Interpretations have been advanced 
presenting Lopez-Mendoza as either a decision intended to significantly 
curtail constitutional protections in immigration proceedings41 or 
designed to champion the exclusionary rule.42 Such arguments focus 
overwhelmingly on the egregiousness exception articulated in Part V, to 
the detriment of the widespread-violations argument.43 As a 
consequence, they ignore the full significance of the widespread-
violations exception, and fail to appreciate the full extent of the Court’s 
attitude toward the potential utility and applicability of the exclusionary 
rule. This Article proposes a more complete interpretation of Lopez-
 
presence in this country”). The second is that applying the exclusionary rule would 
slow down the currently streamlined immigration system because neither immigration 
judges nor immigration attorneys “are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of 
Fourth Amendment law.” Id. at 1048. The third is that the vast number of aliens 
arrested each year, requiring immigration officers “to compile elaborate, 
contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circumstances of every arrest” would be 
unduly burdensome. Id. at 1049. The fourth is that the “crowded and confused 
circumstances” in which immigration officers apprehend a large number of aliens could 
result in the suppression of large amounts of information that had been obtained entirely 
lawfully. Id. at 1049–50 (“Though the INS agents are instructed to follow procedures 
that adequately protect Fourth Amendment interests, agents will usually be able to 
testify only to the fact that they followed INS rules. The demand for a precise account 
of exactly what happened in each particular arrest would plainly preclude mass arrests, 
even when the INS is confronted, as it often is, with massed numbers of ascertainably 
illegal aliens, and even when the arrests can be and are conducted in full compliance 
with all Fourth Amendment requirements.”).  
 39.  Id. at 1050. 
 40. Id. at 1050–51. 
 41. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary 
Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799 (2000). 
 42. See, e.g., Nicolas J. Watkins & Joel Stewart, Employer Sanctions Update 
and the Employer’s Response, 66 FLA. B.J. 60, 64–65 (1992). 
 43. See, e.g., id. 
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Mendoza, harmonizing the key arguments in Parts I–IV with Part V in 
a way that places particular emphasis upon the significance of the 
widespread-violations exception. 
Three core precepts underpin Parts I–IV of the Lopez-Mendoza 
majority’s opinion. The first, shared by both the Lopez-Mendoza 
majority and dissent, is that deportation proceedings constitute purely 
civil as opposed to criminal actions.44 The second, described by the 
Court as “perhaps [the] most important”45 reason why the exclusionary 
rule need not apply in deportation proceedings, is a belief that the 
immigration service’s internal rules prohibit, and thus prevent, 
constitutional violations by immigration agents.46 The majority opinion 
states that, because only INS agents who have been fully trained and 
well supervised take part in immigration-enforcement operations, the 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is unnecessary in the 
immigration context.47 The third and final fundamental reason 
underpinning Parts I–IV is a shared belief that the potential harms 
inflicted by INS agents if they violated a respondent’s constitutional 
rights could be addressed by the respondent bringing a civil suit and 
seeking declaratory relief.48 Each of these reasons is used to justify the 
Court’s holding that the exclusionary rule need not apply in 
immigration proceedings, and each of these reasons implies that the 
Court believed that constitutional violations by immigration officers 
could not become sufficiently widespread to pose a serious problem. 
 
 44. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038; id. at 1051 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he exclusionary rule must apply in civil deportation proceedings.”). This 
conception of immigration law is, as will be discussed later, profoundly rooted in the 
circumstances and practices of the mid-1980s, rather than those that prevail currently. 
See infra text accompanying notes 205–232. 
 45. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044. 
 46. Id. at 1044–45. The Court suggests a number of reasons why the Justice 
Department’s internal enforcement mechanisms are likely to be the most effective 
means of censuring unconstitutional behavior by immigration officers and protecting 
immigration respondents’ constitutional rights: (1) policies requiring that evidence 
seized through intentionally unlawful conduct be excluded from use in proceedings, id. 
at 1045; (2) the “instruction and examination” of new immigration officers in Fourth 
Amendment law and provision of “periodic refresher courses in law” to experienced 
officers, id.; and (3) rules and regulations requiring “that no one be detained without 
reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested unless there is an 
admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof.” Id. Even at the time the 
Court was writing, this last assertion was far from clear cut. See, e.g., In re Toro, 17 
I. & N. Dec. 340, 342, 344 (BIA 1980) (finding that a vehicle stop based solely on the 
driver’s Latin appearance did not contravene fundamental fairness because the stop was 
made in good faith). 
 47. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045. 
 48. Id. (“The possibility of declaratory relief against the agency thus offers a 
means for challenging the validity of INS practices, when standing requirements for 
bringing such an action can be met.”). 
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B. The Blackmun Papers’ Insights into the  
Widespread-Violations Exception 
 The Harry A. Blackmun Papers in the Library of Congress 
include materials retained by Justice Blackmun relating to every case 
that he heard while sitting on the Supreme Court. The Lopez-Mendoza 
folio49 contains each of the seven drafts of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, 
as well as memoranda drafted by each of the Justices pertaining to their 
vote, memoranda drafted by the Justices’ law clerks, and handwritten 
notes made by Justice Blackman during both oral argument and the 
Justices’ conferences. These materials obviously have no value as 
precedent, and do not by themselves constitute convincing evidence of 
which elements of their decision were most crucial to the Lopez-
Mendoza majority. Nonetheless, they do provide a unique insight into 
the workings of the Court, particularly into the closed world of the 
Justices’ deliberations in conference. Moreover, when read in 
conjunction with Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion and subsequent 
case law, the Blackmun Papers suggest that the issue of whether or not 
constitutional violations by immigration officers were widespread was 
of significant importance to the Justices, and was both informed by, and 
informed, the primary holding of the case. Furthermore, the Blackmun 
Papers plausibly support the argument that the majority considered the 
civil nature of deportation proceedings, the efficacy of the INS’s 
internal rules, and the availability of declaratory relief to be the three 
crucial reasons why constitutional violations by immigration officers 
would not become widespread, and, as a consequence, why the 
exclusionary rule need not apply. 
The handwritten notes that Justice Blackmun took during the 
Lopez-Mendoza conference on April 20, 1984, strongly support the 
argument that Part V of the Lopez-Mendoza opinion plays a crucial role 
contextualizing the rest of the holding. Justice Blackmun’s notes 
indicate that Justice O’Connor was deeply concerned from the outset 
with providing procedural protections for individuals whose 
constitutional rights had been seriously abrogated. According to Justice 
Blackmun’s notes, Justice O’Connor believed that the Court “should 
not mandate the exclusionary rule here at least in the non-egregious 
situation,”50 but that if an INS violation became “so severe as to be a 
 
 49. 407/83-491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.  
 50. See Justice Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes (handwritten) April 20, 
1984, 407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Blackmun April 20 Conference Notes]. 
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Fifth Amendment violation” she “would feel differently.”51 Justice 
Blackmun observed that the issue of the severity and extent of 
Constitutional violations by INS agents was one that was “important for 
her,” underscoring the extent to which Justice O’Connor stressed this 
issue during the conference.52 
Part V of Justice O’Connor’s opinion—which remained unchanged 
from the first to the final draft53—hints at the degree to which she (and 
the other members of the majority) remained committed to her initial 
view that in instances of serious or widespread constitutional violations 
by INS officers, the exclusionary rule should be available to provide 
immigration respondents with some degree of procedural protection. 
Justice O’Connor maintained this position over the objections of some 
members of her majority; Chief Justice Warren Burger apparently had 
no enthusiasm for any application of the exclusionary rule. Justice 
Blackmun’s notes indicate that the Chief Justice believed that “any 
expansion of the exclusionary rule is not good” and that the Court 
should therefore not “extend it here.”54 
The Justices’ internal correspondence also supports an 
interpretation of Part V that underscores the significance of the 
widespread-violation exception. For example, Chief Justice Burger 
wrote to Justice O’Connor explaining that he would not be able to join 
in her opinion if she retained the widespread-violation exception 
because he believed it went “too far.”55 Yet, Justice O’Connor did not 
alter the opinion. Justice Blackmun’s initial comments about whether or 
not the Court should grant certiorari hint that he may have provided the 
original impetus for the majority’s concern with whether constitutional 
violations were widespread.56 This archival evidence strongly suggests 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Compare Justice O’Connor, 1st Draft INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (circulated 
June 1, 1984), 407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C., with Justice O’Connor, 6th Draft INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza (circulated June 22, 1984), 407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 54. Blackmun April 20 Conference Notes, supra note 50. Justice Rehnquist 
apparently also argued during the conference that the Court should not “let the 
exclusionary rule spread”—but nonetheless joined in all of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. 
Id.  
 55. Letter from Chief Justice Warren Burger to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
June 25, 1984, 407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 56. See Preliminary Memorandum on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza from Kerri 
Bartlett, law clerk, to Justice Blackmun, Dec. 13, 1983, 407/83–491, Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
(“[S]ince 1952 there has been a total of fewer than fifty Fourth Amendment challenges 
to the admissibility of evidence in deportation proceedings.”). 
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that the question of whether constitutional violations were widespread 
mattered considerably to the Lopez-Mendoza majority, and influenced 
their decision that the exclusionary rule need not apply in immigration 
proceedings. 
Justice Blackmun’s conference notes also suggest why the Lopez-
Mendoza majority believed that constitutional violations by immigration 
officers were unlikely to become widespread. The notes, for example, 
highlight the great importance the Justices in the Lopez-Mendoza 
majority placed on what they perceived to be the purely civil nature of 
deportation proceedings. According to Justice Blackmun’s notes, 
Justice Lewis Powell stated in the conference that he saw immigration 
proceedings as involving “deportation to native lands, not jailing,”57 
and Justice O’Connor believed “deportation is not criminal.”58 Justice 
Blackmun, the crucial fifth vote for the Lopez-Mendoza majority,59 
wrote before oral argument had taken place that a deportation 
proceeding “is a civil proceeding.”60 The Blackmun papers also contain 
Justice O’Connor’s seven drafts of the opinion, each of which uses 
exactly the same language to describe deportation proceedings as 
“purely civil action[s],” the purpose of which was solely “to determine 
eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”61 
It is possible to trace the individual Justices’ comments in conference 
about the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings through to 
the final opinion. For example, Justice Powell’s view that deportation 
proceedings were not focused on “jailing,” was reflected in the final 
opinion’s emphasis upon the limited powers of immigration judges to 
 
 57. Blackmun April 20 Conference Notes, supra note 50. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Upon receipt of Justice O’Connor’s first draft of the Lopez-Mendoza 
opinion, one of Justice Blackmun’s law clerks noted that “[o]bviously, SOC has 
circulated this draft to you because you are the fifth vote and she wants to nail down 
her Court.” Memorandum from Anna Durand, law clerk, to Justice Blackmun, May 
23, 1984, 407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 60. Justice Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes (handwritten) April 18, 1984, 
407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. According to Justice Blackmun’s conference notes for April 20, 
1984, Justice Marshall was the only Justice to argue that a deportation hearing was “not 
a civil proceeding.” Blackmun April 20 Conference Notes, supra note 50.  
 61. Compare Justice O’Connor, 1st Draft INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, at 6 
(circulated June 1, 1984), 407/83–491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., with Justice O’Connor, 6th Draft 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, at 6 (circulated June 22, 1984), 407/83–491, Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
ELIAS - FINAL 1/28/2009 9:19 AM 
1122 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
oppose punitive sanctions upon respondents,62 and upon the prospective 
rather than retrospective mandate of immigration courts.63 
The few mentions of internal INS procedures in Justice 
Blackmun’s notes are also consistent with the opinion’s explicit 
statement that the efficacy of INS internal guidelines was perhaps the 
most important reason for the court’s opinion. According to Justice 
Blackmun, Chief Justice Burger believed that INS was “better than 
most police departments”64 at preventing constitutional violations from 
occurring, whereas Justice Byron White believed the main reason to 
apply the exclusionary rule was “to keep officers within bounds.”65 
While Justice Blackmun’s notes contain few references to INS agents’ 
behavior, nothing in his notes contradicts the importance of the Court’s 
explicit statement in the final opinion that the efficacy of INS internal 
guidelines was perhaps the most important reason the Court believed 
that immigration respondents’ rights could be safeguarded without 
applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings. 
Justice Blackmun’s notes do, however, suggest that both the 
Lopez-Mendoza majority and the dissent were preoccupied by the issue 
of declaratory relief. This concern was evident during the majority 
opinion’s drafting process,66 as the opinion evolved in reaction to the 
criticisms leveled by the dissenting Justices. Justice John Paul Stevens 
apparently expressed concerns during the conference that declaratory 
relief would not be realistically attainable, even by full-fledged US 
citizens,67 and Justice White’s dissent (in which Justice Stevens joined) 
argued that: 
The suggestion that alternative remedies, such as civil suits, 
provide adequate protection is unrealistic. Contrary to the 
situation in criminal cases, once the Government has 
improperly obtained evidence against an illegal alien, he is 
removed from the country and is therefore in no position to 
 
 62. The opinion notes that an immigration judge’s “sole power is to order 
deportation; the judge cannot adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any crime 
related to unlawful entry into or presence in this country.” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). 
 63. Id. (“Past conduct is relevant only insofar as it may shed light on the 
respondent’s right to remain.”). 
 64. Blackmun April 20 Conference Notes, supra note 50. 
 65. Id. 
 66. The first draft of the opinion stated, “In addition, actions for constitutional 
torts remain open to those subject to unlawful searches and seizures.” Justice 
O’Connor, 1st Draft INS v. Lopez-Mendoza at 6 (circulated June 1, 1984), 407/83–
491, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C.  
 67. See Blackmun April 20 Conference Notes, supra note 50. 
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file civil actions in federal courts. Moreover, those who are 
legally in the country but are nonetheless subjected to illegal 
searches and seizures are likely to be poor and uneducated, 
and many will not speak English. It is doubtful that the threat 
of civil suits by these persons will strike fear into the hearts of 
those who enforce the Nation’s immigration laws.68 
 C. Subsequent Case Law Interpreting Lopez-Mendoza 
The text of the majority opinion and the records from the 
Blackmun Papers support the argument that fundamental beliefs in the 
abiding civil nature of immigration proceedings, the efficacy of INS’s 
internal rules, and the availability of declaratory relief underpinned the 
Court’s holding in Lopez-Mendoza and informed its opinion that 
widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment were unlikely to occur. 
This interpretation of Lopez-Mendoza is further bolstered by the 
immigration case law of the 1980s, 1990s and early twenty-first 
century. 
Circuit-court rulings in the years immediately following Lopez-
Mendoza—particularly decisions that were published in the months 
immediately following the Supreme Court’s ruling—emphasized the 
civil nature of deportation proceedings; the supposed efficacy of INS 
training and internal regulations as guarantors of rights; and the 
availability of other declaratory relief in other forums. A typical 
example of this post-Lopez-Mendoza approach is found in another case 
from 1984, Adamson v. Commissioner,69 in which the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Lopez-Mendoza upon 
the utility of internal rules and regulations as rights guarantors and held 
that internal training and regulation should be presumed to impart 
sufficient understanding of Fourth Amendment protections such that 
any well-trained government official’s subsequent violation of the 
Fourth Amendment should be considered egregious.70 
In the twenty-five years since Lopez-Mendoza, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First,71 Second,72 Third,73 Fourth,74 Fifth,75 
 
 68. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 69. 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 70. Id. at 545. See also Judge Pregerson’s dissent in Cervantes-Cuevas v. 
INS, 797 F.2d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1985), in which he notes that the Court suggested bad 
faith would be found if a reasonably competent officer would have believed the search 
to be illegal. 
 71. Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 72. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 73. United States v. Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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Sixth,76 Seventh,77 Eighth,78 Ninth,79 and Tenth Circuits80 have each 
reached milestone decisions, refining their jurisdiction’s interpretation 
of Lopez-Mendoza. Different circuits have emphasized some aspects of 
the Lopez-Mendoza holding and deemphasized others. For example, in 
some jurisdictions the Part V exceptions have been interpreted more 
broadly,81 and in some they have been interpreted more narrowly.82 But 
three consistent threads run through each opinion: an emphasis on the 
civil nature of immigration proceedings, a professed faith in ICE’s 
internal regulations, and an acknowledgement that declaratory relief 
should be obtained in separate proceedings, not in immigration court. 
In each of the circuits, the vision and principles expressed by Lopez-
Mendoza in 1984 have endured. However, although the arguments 
against the application of the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings remain largely unchanged since 1984, other aspects of 
immigration jurisprudence and the circumstances of immigration 
respondents have changed radically in the twenty-five years since 
Lopez-Mendoza was decided. The next Part of this Article illustrates 
the extent to which the situation feared by the Court in Lopez-Mendoza 
has arisen, and violations of immigration respondents’ constitutional 
rights have become widespread. 
II. 2009: THE WIDESPREAD OCCURRENCE OF  
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
In the twenty-five years since Lopez-Mendoza, as the policies and 
practices of immigration-enforcement agencies have changed 
radically,83 respondents in immigration proceedings have argued with 
 
 74. United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 75. Velasquez-Tabir v. INS, 127 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 76. Miguel v. INS, 359 F.3d 408, 411 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 77. Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 78. United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 79. Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 504 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 80. United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 81. See, e.g., Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 
2006) (holding that any arrest predicated on race is an arrest for “no reason at all” and 
is per se egregious); Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 504 (holding that arresting an individual 
based on his “foreign sounding name” was egregious). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 
2007) (holding that illegally obtained fingerprints are admissible because they are 
identity related); Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1106 (holding that under Lopez-
Mendoza an individual may not challenge a court’s jurisdiction over him because of an 
illegal arrest).  
 83. Restrictions on law-enforcement actions have lessened markedly in recent 
years. See Henry G. Watkins, The Fourth Amendment and the INS: An Update on 
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increasing frequency that evidence against them should be suppressed 
because it was obtained illegally by government officials whose actions 
violated the respondents’ constitutional rights. 
The arguments advanced by respondents in such cases have almost 
exclusively focused upon the last two exceptions to the inapplicability 
of the exclusionary rule provided by the Court in Part V of Lopez-
Mendoza—namely, “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or 
other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and 
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”84 Interpreting 
BIA definitions of egregiousness that predated Lopez-Mendoza,85 courts 
of appeal have developed differing standards of egregiousness and 
different definitions of what might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness.86 
By 2004, however, there were so many examples of motions to 
suppress argued on the grounds that individuals were seized on the 
basis of race alone—consistently understood as an egregious violation 
of the Fourth Amendment87—that one commentator suggested that 
suppression of evidence due to widespread violations of the 
Constitution might be warranted.88 In 2008, an article in the American 
 
Locating the Undocumented and a Discussion on Judicial Avoidance of Race-Based 
Investigative Targeting in Constitutional Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499, 500 
(1991); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 519 (2004). 
 84. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (citing Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). 
 85. See, e.g., In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (BIA 1980) (barring 
admission of involuntary statements); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980) 
(“[T]he manner of seizing evidence [may be] so egregious that to rely on it would 
offend the fifth amendment’s due process requirement of fundamental fairness.”). 
 86. See, e.g., Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235 (holding that if an individual 
is subjected to a seizure “for no reason at all” and the “seizure is sufficiently severe,” 
then it constitutes an egregious violation and the evidence resulting from the seizure 
should be suppressed); Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 492–93 (7th Cir. 
2002) (recognizing the Lopez-Mendoza suppression rule but declining to exclude 
evidence on the facts of the case); Ruckbi v. INS, 285 F.3d 120, 125 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(same); Westover v. Reno, 202 F.3d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); Orhorhaghe, 38 
F.3d at 503–04 (excluding evidence where an INS search and seizure was based solely 
on the person’s Nigerian sounding name); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1452 
(9th Cir. 1994) (excluding evidence where an INS search and seizure was based solely 
on the person’s Hispanic appearance); Arguelles-Vasquez v. INS, 786 F.2d 1433, 1435 
(9th Cir. 1986) (same). 
 87. See, e.g., Martinez-Camargo, 282 F.3d at 492; Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 
503–04. 
 88. See Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1114 (2004) (presenting evidence of 
widespread racial discrimination in immigration enforcement such that “[u]nder the 
logic of Lopez-Mendoza itself, the exclusionary rule may now be appropriate in 
immigration proceedings”). 
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Bar Association Journal described a newly-emergent trend, whereby 
immigration practitioners were beginning to argue that constitutional 
violations by ICE have become so widespread that it may be necessary 
to revisit the Supreme Court’s holding in Lopez-Mendoza.89 This Part 
explores how and why violations of immigration respondents’ rights 
have become widespread. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary 
defines widespread as “spread among a large number or over a wide 
area.”90 Accordingly, this Part considers the increase in the 
geographical ambit of allegations of violations of immigration 
respondents’ rights and the increase in the number of institutional actors 
throughout the country involved in alleged incidences of constitutional 
violations. 
A. Constitutional Violations Have Become Geographically Widespread 
The Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration 
Review (EOIR) is responsible for maintaining records showing the 
disposition of immigration cases.91 However, these records are too 
aggregated to provide an accurate indication of the number of motions 
to suppress and terminate filed and granted in immigration courts in the 
United States.92 EOIR records show that between 1952 and 1979—the 
year that the Lopez-Mendoza respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and 
Elias Sandoval-Sanchez first appeared in immigration court—fewer than 
fifty motions to suppress evidence or terminate proceedings had ever 
 
 89. Stephanie Francis Ward, Illegal Aliens on I.C.E.: Tougher Immigration 
Enforcement Tactics Spur Challenges, ABA JOURNAL, June 2008, at 44, 45, available 
at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/illegal_aliens_on_ice (“Immigration lawyers 
say the searches have become both—widespread and egregious—and that it is time for 
the court to revisit Lopez-Mendoza.”). 
 90. Askoxford.com, Definition of Widespread, http://www.askoxford.com/ 
concise_oed/widespread?view=uk (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
 91. Each year the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) publishes 
a statistical yearbook providing a full report on all of its activities during the previous 
financial year. Data is available for the past twelve years, showing the number of 
individuals in immigration proceedings and the outcome of those proceedings; that is, 
the number of individuals removed, the number of individuals granted a form of relief 
(such as cancellation of removal), and the number of individuals whose termination 
proceedings were granted. See USDOJ.gov, Statistical Year Book, 
http://www.uddog.gov/eoir/statspub/syb2000main.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) 
(displaying links to the Statistical Year Books from 2000–07).  
 92. For example, it is impossible to measure the number of motions to 
suppress and terminate brought by immigration respondents that have prevailed, not 
least because the vast majority of motions to terminate proceedings are not granted in 
response to respondents’ motions to suppress, but rather in response to motions by ICE 
trial attorneys. 
ELIAS - FINAL 1/28/2009 9:19 AM 
2008:1109 Good Reason to Believe 1127 
been filed in immigration court.93 Twenty-eight years later, in 2007 
alone, 21,144 motions to terminate were granted.94 These numbers are 
attention-grabbing; even assuming every single pre-1979 motion to 
terminate was granted, this would constitute at least a 10,000 fold 
increase in terminations annually, depending on what percentage of pre-
1979 motions to terminate were eventually granted. But, this number is 
statistically meaningless due to different units of analysis, vastly 
different numbers of individuals in removal proceedings,95 different 
agencies with responsibility for immigration enforcement,96 and 
different security concerns,97 all of which inform very different patterns 
of enforcement activity.98 
 
 93. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1071 (1984) (describing how, 
prior to the decision of the BIA in In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979), 
neither the BIA nor any court had held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in civil 
deportation proceedings, and observing that the Board in Sandoval noted that there 
were “fewer than fifty BIA proceedings since 1952” in which motions had been made 
to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds). 
 94. EOIR FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 21, at D2 (showing 
the disposition of immigration cases for the years 2003–07 and the availability of 
different forms of relief). 
 95. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INS, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 215 (2002), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/1999/FY99Yearbook.pdf. In 
2007, there were 167,999 formal removals, compared to only 26,825 in 1979. 
Compare id. with EOIR FY 2007 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 21, at D2. 
 96. In 1979 the agency responsible for immigration enforcement was the INS, 
while today it is ICE. 
 97. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) have had a profound 
effect on immigration enforcement. 
 98. ICE’s Fugitive Operations Teams have undertaken a number of high-
profile nationwide “enforcement operations,” such as Operation “Return To Sender,” 
see Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, More than 300 
Arrested in ICE Operation Targeting Illegal Alien Fugitives and Immigration Violators 
in San Diego and Imperial Counties (Apr. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070403sandiego.htm; Operation 
“Cross-Check,” see Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE 
Arrests 148 Immigration Violators, Criminals and Fugitives in Dallas (Apr. 27, 2007), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070427dallas.htm 
(targeting individuals with any kind of criminal record); Operation “Community 
Shield,” see Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 11 Arrested 
in Kenosha During ICE-led Operation Targeting Gang Members (Nov. 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0811/081120kenosha.htm (targeting foreign-born 
alleged gang members). There are also workplace Enforcement Initiatives, such as 
Operation “Wagon-Train,” which targeted workers at six Swift plants located in 
Greeley, Colorado; Grand Island, Nebraska; Cactus, Texas; Hyrum, Utah; 
Marshalltown, Iowa; and Worthington, Minnesota, see Press Release, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Worksite Enforcement: Operation Wagon 
Train (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0811/081120kenosha.htm. 
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In the absence of data systematically demonstrating an increasingly 
wide geographical spread of cases in which immigration judges held 
that immigration officers had violated respondents’ constitutional rights, 
it is appropriate to consider the relevance of more episodic data, 
including affidavits provided to immigration courts in written 
complaints, sworn testimony given to Congressional hearings, and 
media accounts of ICE operations. These sources provide some 
indication of the geographical distribution of alleged violations of 
immigration respondents’ constitutional rights and suggest a strikingly 
wide geographical ambit of reported allegations of constitutional 
violations by immigration agents and other law-enforcement officers 
engaged in immigration operations.99 In 1986, just two years after 
Lopez-Mendoza, one commentator observed that there had already been 
an increase in Fourth Amendment violations by immigration officials.100 
Fifteen years later, in 2001, an INS report to the House Appropriations 
Committee highlighted racially biased, and therefore unconstitutional, 
enforcement of racially neutral policies.101 Last year, organizations 
ranging from the United Nations102 to the United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union103 undertook investigations into ICE 
misconduct and criticized ICE agents for their violation of individuals’ 
 
 99. See infra Appendix (showing the various locations of alleged constitutional 
violations). 
 100. See Katharine Auchincloss Lorr, Employer Sanctions and the Fourth 
Amendment: Lessons from OSHA for the Immigration Bar, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 57 
(1990) (quoting the court in Int. Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union v. Nelson, 
799 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1986) that they had found an “evident systematic policy 
and practice of fourth amendment violations” by the INS, including extensive evidence 
of INS agents “exceeding official policy”).  
 101. See Wishnie, supra note 88, at 1106–07 (citing Letter from Janis A. 
Sposato, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Rep. Wolf, Chair, Subcomm. on the Dep’ts of 
Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, of the House 
Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 21, 2001) (noting disproportionately higher rates of 
referrals of Asians, African-Americans, and Hispanics for secondary inspection based 
on a review of over five million primary inspections at JFK Airport)). 
 102. U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to 
Development 16, U.N. Doc A/HRC/7/12/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2008) (prepared by Jorge 
Bustamante) (noting increased workplace and household raids by ICE agents who have 
“frequent disregard of due process”); id. at 17 (“The Special Rapporteur heard 
accounts from victims that ICE officials entered their homes without a warrant, denied 
them access to lawyers or a phone to call family members and coerced them to sign 
‘voluntary departure’ agreements.”).  
 103. See N.C. Aizenman, Immigration Agency Accused of Illegal Searches, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2008, at A4 (reporting that members of a private commission 
accused ICE of routinely violating Fourth Amendment rights during workplace raids, 
such as by misusing a warrant to arrest a limited number of workers in the hope of 
catching other undocumented people in the area). 
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constitutional rights. Concern about the extent to which law-
enforcement officers are violating immigration respondents’ 
constitutional rights even prompted a congressional hearing to 
investigate allegations of ICE misconduct.104 
In May 2006, ICE launched “Operation Return to Sender,” a 
nationwide initiative designed to apprehend fugitive aliens.105 Over 
23,000 individuals have been arrested by ICE Fugitive Operation 
Teams (FOTs) in a series of raids on homes and offices.106 The 
majority of those arrested in these raids were not fugitive aliens for 
whom the ICE FOTs had arrest warrants, but rather individuals 
categorized by ICE as “collateral arrests”—individuals who happened 
to be present at the site of a FOT raid, and about whom, prior to their 
warrantless arrests, ICE typically held no information.107 In the two 
years since “Operation Return to Sender” began, allegations that ICE 
FOTs have committed a wide range of constitutional violations have 
been made in a variety of cases, civil complaints,108 notarized 
affidavits,109 testimony given at Congressional hearings, and media 
reports in Arizona,110 California,111 Colorado,112 Connecticut,113 
 
 104. On February 13, 2008, the House Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law held a hearing on 
“Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal.” Problems with ICE 
Interrogation, Detention, and Removal Procedures: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int’l Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong., (Feb. 13, 2008), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_021308.html. 
 105. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, supra 
note 98.  
 106. See Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Bay Area Reacts Angrily to Series of 
Immigration Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2007, at A14. 
 107. See, e.g., Tom Lochner, Civil Rights Advocates Question Actions of 
Immigration Agents, OAKLAND TRIB., Mar. 10, 2007 (“In Contra Costa County from 
Jan. 8 to 19, Return to Sender resulted in 119 arrests, including 20 people on the 
deportation list, a ratio of about five collateral arrests for every ‘target’ according to 
figures supplied by ICE.”); Elliot Spagat, Immigrants Are ‘Collateral Arrests’, S. FLA. 
SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at 3A. (reporting that “collateral arrests” made up 59 
percent of all arrests in Dallas and El Paso, Texas, 54 percent in New York City, and 
57 percent in San Diego). 
 108. Many of the civil complaints and notarized affidavits referenced in this 
Section were collated by Rachel Bengston of Centro Legal, Inc. in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
The author is extremely grateful to Ms. Bengtson for sharing her research. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project: Hearings Before 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Int’l Law of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Hartzler 
Testimony] (written testimony of Kara Hartzler, Esq.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Hartzler080213.pdf. 
 111. See Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, Reyes v. Alcantor, No. 07-cv-02271 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 
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Florida,114 Georgia,115 Illinois,116 Iowa,117 Maryland,118 
Massachusetts,119 Minnesota,120 Missouri,121 Nebraska,122 New Jersey,123 
 
14, 2008) (on file with author); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
National Lawyers Guild et al. v. Chertoff et al., No. 08-01000 (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 
14, 2008) (on file with author); Paloma Esquivel, Civil Rights Groups Allege 
Immigrant Workers Were Denied Rights, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at B5.  
 112. See Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus, Yarrito v. Meyers, No. 06-CV-
2494 (D. Colo. filed  Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with author). 
 113. See Complaint, Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07-cv-01436 (D. Conn. filed 
Nov. 26, 2007) (on file with author); Complaint, El Badrawi v. DHS, No. 3:07-cv-
01074, ¶ 5 (D. Conn. filed July 13, 2007) (on file with author); Complaint, Danbury 
Area Coal. for the Rights of Immigrants v. DHS, No. 3:06-cv-01992 (D. Conn. filed 
Dec. 14, 2006) (on file with author). 
 114. See Damien Cave, States Take New Tack on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2008, at A1 (“At Red Barn Barbecue, witnesses said that skin color 
clearly influenced police procedure. When several officers visited and saw no one who 
was Hispanic in the kitchen, they moved on. ‘We offered to give them records, and 
they said, ‘No, it’s not necessary,’’ said Randy Brochu, whose family owns the 
business.”). 
 115. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal 
Procedures: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Feb. 
13, 2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mancha 
080213.pdf [hereinafter Mancha Testimony] (statement of Marie Justeen Mancha); 
Complaint, Mancha v. ICE, No. 06-cv-12650 (N.D. Ga. filed Nov. 1, 2006) (on file 
with author).  
 116. See Kari Lydersen, Abuses Alleged During Immigration Raids, IN THESE 
TIMES, May 2007, at 11. 
 117. See Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal 
Procedures: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (Feb. 
13th, 2008), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ 
Graves080213.pdf, [hereinafter Graves Testimony] (statement of Michael Graves, 
Member of UFCW, Local 1149). 
 118. See Justin Fenton & Kelly Brewington, 46 Held in Immigration Sweep, 
BALT. SUN, July 1, 2008, at 1B. 
 119. See Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007); Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Emergency Motion for Expedited 
Hearing, Sandoval v. ICE, No. 07-cv-10471 (D. Mass. filed Mar. 8, 2007) (on file 
with author). 
 120. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and 
Damages, Barrera v. DHS, No. 07-cv-03879, ¶ 1 (D. Minn filed Sept. 4, 2007) (on file 
with author). 
 121. See Complaint, Asamoah-Boadu v. Missouri, No. 07AC-CC00983 (Mo. 
Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 25, 2007). 
 122. See Complaint, Class Action Request for Injunctive Relief and Damages, 
Jury Demand on Damage Claims, United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. 
DHS, No. 07-cv-00188, ¶ 22 (N.D. Tex. filed Sept. 12, 2007) (on file with author). 
 123. See Affidavit of Gonzalo Juarez, ¶¶ 7–8, 10, 20 (June 27, 2007) (on file 
with author). 
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New Mexico,124 New York,125 North Carolina,126 Ohio,127 Rhode 
Island,128 Tennessee,129 Texas,130 and Washington.131 
The ways in which ICE agents are alleged to have violated the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights of immigration respondents are as 
varied as the locations in which the violations are alleged to have 
occurred. Pretextual traffic stops are alleged to have been employed in 
Danbury, Connecticut;132 Bexar, Texas;133 and Whatcom County, 
 
 124. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages to Remedy Civil Rights Violations 
and Common Law Torts, Border Network for Human Rights v. County of Otero, No. 
07-cv-01045, ¶¶ 1–4 (D.N.M. filed Oct. 17, 2007) (on file with author); Complaint, 
Daniel T. ex rel. Robinson v. Border Network for Human Rights v. County of Otero, 
No. 07-cv-01044 (D.N.M. filed Oct. 17, 2007) (on file with author). 
 125. See In re Rabani, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, supra 
note 28; In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, supra 
note 28; Class Action Complaint, Aguilar v. ICE, No. 07-cv-08224, ¶¶ 1–3 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Sept. 20, 2007) (on file with author); Motion to Suppress and/or Terminate 
Proceedings for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and Agency 
Regulations and Memo of Points and Authorities, In re Chicas Moran (U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review July 20, 2007) (on file with the 
author); Motion to Suppress and/or Terminate Proceedings for Violations of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments and Agency Regulations and Memo of Points and Authorities, 
In re Lopez Ramos (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review 
July 20, 2007) (on file with author); Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau 
Complains to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at B1. 
 126. See Steven Greenhouse, U.S. Officials Defend Ploys to Catch 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2006, at A8 (describing ICE agents’ impersonation 
of federal health and safety officials as a ruse to detain and arrest undocumented 
workers). 
 127. See Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction, Martinez v. Chertoff, No. 07-cv-00722 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 
2007) (on file with author). 
 128. See Karen Lee Ziner, ACLU Sues State Police, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 9, 
2007, at B1 (describing the ACLU’s claim that state troopers “knew or should have 
known that the search, seizure and detention of the plaintiffs were without reasonable or 
probable cause, and were therefore unlawful under the circumstances”). 
 129. See Motion to Suppress Evidence and Terminate Proceeding with 
Supporting Memorandum of Law, In re Cervantes-Valerio (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
Executive Office for Immigration Review Oct. 23, 2007); Jury Demand, Flores-
Morales v. George, No. 07-cv-0050, ¶ 1 (M.D. filed Tenn. July 5, 2007) (on file with 
author).  
 130. See Complaint, Class Action Request for Injunctive Relief and Damages, 
Jury Demand on Damage Claims, United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. 
DHS, No. 07-cv-00188 (N.D. Tex. filed Sept. 12, 2007) (on file with author); 
Affidavit of Jose Ordonez-Salanec, ¶¶ 8, 10 (May 22, 2007) (on file with author). 
 131. See In re X, Order of the Immigration Judge (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
Executive Office for Immigration Review Feb. 8, 2008) (on file with author). 
 132. See Complaint, Barrera v. Boughton, supra note 113 (“One Plaintiff in 
this action was unlawfully arrested by DPD for a civil immigration violation after a 
pretextual and race-based traffic stop, transferred to ICE custody, and eventually 
deported.”).  
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Washington.134 Warrantless home invasions are alleged to have been 
undertaken in Willmar, Minnesota;135 Newark, New Jersey;136 and 
Otero, New Mexico.137 Illegal workplace seizures are alleged to have 
been undertaken in Los Angeles, California;138 Worthington, 
Minnesota;139 and Goldsboro, North Carolina.140 Illegal racial profiling 
is alleged to have been used to target individuals in Florence, 
Arizona;141 Jacksonville, Florida;142 and Memphis, Tennessee.143 
Unnecessary force is alleged to have been used during arrests in 
Chicago, Illinois;144 Anne Arundel County, Maryland;145 Hicksville, 
New York;146 and Maury County, Tennessee.147 United States citizen 
 
 133. See Affidavit of Jose Ordonez-Salanec, supra note 130, ¶ 1 (“At the time 
of my arrest [by the Border Patrol], I had violated no traffic law, all of the inspection 
stickers on the vehicle that I was driving were current, and there were no warrants for 
my arrest that would have justified the stop and arrest.”). 
 134. See In re X, Order of the Immigration Judge, supra note 131, at 2 (“[T]he 
respondent daughters were the subjects of a racially motivated traffic stop by a deputy 
sheriff . . . .”). 
 135. See Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
and Damages, Arias v. ICE, 07-cv-001959, ¶ 1 (D. Minn. filed July 27, 2007) (on file 
with author).  
 136. See Affidavit of Gonzalo Juarez, supra note 123, ¶ 7 (“The officer told 
me to ‘come inside.’ He did not ask me for permission to enter. I never gave 
permission for him to enter.”).  
 137. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages to Remedy Civil Rights Violations 
and Common Law Torts, Border Network for Human Rights v. County of Otero, supra 
note 124, ¶ 12 (“Defendants began targeting Hispanic families in their own homes by 
initiating random sweeps of trailers in the area . . . .”). 
 138. See Esquivel, supra note 111. 
 139. See Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and 
Damages, Barrera v. DHS, supra note 120, ¶ 24. 
 140. See Greenhouse, supra note 126 (describing ICE agents’ impersonation of 
federal health and safety officials as a ruse to detain and arrest undocumented workers). 
 141. See Hartzler Testimony, supra note 110. 
 142. See In re Rabani, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, supra 
note 28 (“[Respondent] did not see them question a single person other than himself 
. . . . He believes they approached him because of his Middle Eastern appearance.”). 
 143. See Motion to Suppress Evidence and Terminate Proceeding with 
Supporting Memorandum of Law, In re Cervantes-Valerio, supra note 129, at 2, 6–7. 
 144. See Lyderson, supra note 116, at 11 (describing how one woman “was 
invasively strip-searched, and told the process was a search for hidden drugs. She was 
handcuffed so tightly that it left marks on her wrists, she says, and she was unable to 
get pain medication for severe tendonitis in her ankle”). 
 145. See Fenton & Brewington, supra note 118 (describing a pregnant woman 
being shoved roughly). 
 146. See Motion to Suppress and/or Terminate Proceedings for Violations of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and Agency Regulations and Memo of Points and 
Authorities, In re Chicas Moran, supra note 125, at 3 (“[A]s I was about to leave for 
my job . . . I was stopped inside my apartment by about five armed men. These men 
threw me and my roommates down on the floor and handcuffed us.”). 
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children are alleged to have been detained by armed officers in San 
Rafael, California;148 New Haven, Connecticut;149 and Reidsville, 
Georgia.150 Respondents were allegedly denied access to counsel in 
Greeley, Colorado;151 New Bedford, Massachusetts;152 and Cactus, 
Texas.153 Individuals are alleged to have been stopped and questioned 
without reasonable suspicion in Twin Falls, Idaho;154 New York, New 
York;155 and Richmond, Rhode Island;156 and detained without probable 
cause in Marshalltown, Iowa;157 Grand Island, Nebraska;158 and East 
Hampton, New York.159 
This sample is based upon cases currently pending before 
immigration courts and courts of appeal, as well as findings in favor of 
 
 147. See Jury Demand, Flores-Morales v. George, supra note 129.  
 148. See Complaint for Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, Reyes v. Alcantor, supra note 111, ¶¶ 4, 11 (“[Kebin 
Reyes] . . . is seven years old . . . . Defendants told Kebin that he would only need to 
stay at the ICE office for an hour or two. Instead, they held him in a locked room all 
day against his will. Kebin thought he was in jail. Defendants refused to give Kebin any 
food, other than bread and water. Kebin was hungry and crying. He did not know when 
he would be free to leave.”). 
 149. See Nina Bernstein, Promise of ID Cards Is Followed by Peril of Arrest 
for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2007. 
 150. See Complaint, Mancha v. ICE, supra note 115, ¶¶ 24–29; Mancha 
Testimony, supra note 110, at 35.  
 151. See Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus, Yarrito v. Meyers, supra note 
112, ¶¶ 11, 13.  
 152. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory & 
Injunctive Relief, Sandoval v. ICE, No. 07-cv-10471 (D. Mass. Filed Mar. 8, 2007) 
(on file with author). 
 153. See Complaint, Class Action Request for Injunctive Relief and Damages, 
Jury Demand on Damage Claims, United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union v. 
DHS, supra note 130, ¶¶ 22, 24, 27.  
 154. See Ward, supra note 89, at 47. (“In Twin Falls, Idaho, for example, 
immigration lawyers allege that [Customs and Border Protection] officers in 2007 
approached shoppers at a warehouse grocery store, asking to see documentation. The 
business, WinCo Foods, is popular with the area’s Latino residents, and some say that 
individuals were stopped without probable cause.”).  
 155. See In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, 
supra note 125. 
 156. See Ziner, supra note 128 (describing the ACLU’s claim that state 
troopers “knew or should have known that the search, seizure and detention of the 
plaintiffs were without reasonable or probable cause, and were therefore unlawful 
under the circumstances”). 
 157. See Graves Testimony, supra note 117, at 38 (“There was no legitimate 
reason. There was no probable cause. Our plant—our workplace—had been 
transformed into a prison or detention center.”). 
 158.  See Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction, Martinez v. Chertoff, supra note 127, ¶¶ 23, 25.  
 159. See Nina Bernstein, Immigration Raids Single Out Hispanics, Lawsuit 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21, 2007, at B3. 
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immigration respondents in immigration and federal court. While some 
of the allegations detailed in the pending cases included in this sample 
may not ultimately be proven, this sample at the very least 
demonstrates that over the last two-year period, immigration-
enforcement officers have consistently been accused of engaging in 
behavior that threatens immigration respondents’ constitutional rights.160 
One possible explanation for the increase in the number of motions 
to suppress and terminate filed in immigration court might be increased 
activism by members of the immigration-defense bar, rather than 
increased unconstitutional conduct by ICE. However, such an 
explanation misapprehends the role played by immigration lawyers. For 
a variety of reasons, including language barriers and a lack of financial 
resources, the overwhelming majority of immigration respondents 
never have the opportunity to consult with an attorney. A report 
released by the National Immigrant Justice Center (NIJC) in 2008 
suggests that language difficulties prevent immigration respondents 
from fully comprehending or realizing this right.161 This is not a new 
phenomenon; research undertaken in 2001 found that 90 percent of 
persons detained in immigration custody were unable to retain counsel 
to represent them.162 
The number of individuals detained for civil immigration violations 
has increased sharply in the past seven years. According to Secretary of 
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff’s recent testimony to the House 
Judiciary Committee, ICE removed more that 280,000 individuals from 
the United States during the 2007 fiscal year.163 The overwhelming 
majority of these respondents were not represented by legal counsel,164 
leaving them “at a painful disadvantage when trying to present their 
cases to judges and opposing counsel who possess years of experience 
in immigration law.”165 As Justice White noted in his Lopez-Mendoza 
 
 160. See infra Appendix. 
 161. Language Barriers May Lead Immigrants to Waive Right to Hearing 
Before Deportation, IMMIGRANTJUSTICE.ORG, June 3, 2008, http://www.immigrant 
justice.org/news/detention/stiporders. 
 162. Hartzler Testimony, supra note 110, at 17; Elizabeth Amon, INS Fails to 
See the Light, NATIONAL L.J., Mar. 5, 2001, at A1. 
 163. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security Oversight Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong., at 8 (Mar. 5, 2008), available at 
www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1204746985090.shtm [hereinafter Chertoff 
Testimony] (statement of Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Security). ICE claims that slightly fewer individuals (276,912) were removed during 
the same period. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FY07 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/factsheets/ 
fy07accmplshmntsweb.pdf. 
 164. Hartzler Testimony, supra note 110, at 17. 
 165. Id. 
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dissent, individuals placed in proceedings without the advice of a 
trained legal professional are highly unlikely to comprehend the extent 
to which their constitutional rights have been violated, and even less 
likely to realize that they are able to petition the immigration court to 
suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the arresting law-
enforcement officers’ illegal actions.166 Given the limited role of the 
immigration bar, formal allegations of ICE misconduct brought during 
immigration proceedings may significantly underreport the actual 
incidence of unconstitutional activity by ICE. In the words of Professor 
Dan Kanstroom, “What we’re seeing in court is really just the tip of the 
iceberg.”167 
B. Constitutional Violations Have Become Institutionally Widespread 
Since September 11, 2001, one particular development in law-
enforcement officers’ interaction with immigrants has had a 
considerable impact upon the frequency of the violation of immigration 
respondents’ constitutional rights—the involvement of state and local 
police in immigration enforcement.168 In 2002, the Department of 
Justice abandoned its longstanding practice of separating INS’s civil 
enforcement of immigration laws from the criminal-law enforcement 
mandate of state and local police.169 The rationale given for this radical 
departure from previous practice170 was that police assistance was 
required to further the administration’s “war on terror.”171 
 
 166. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 167. Ward, supra note 89, at 50. 
 168. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 88, at 1085–88. Paradoxically, state and 
local police officers well versed in Fourth Amendment rights in a criminal context do 
not appear to apply the same standards when engaged in immigration enforcement 
activities. Id. at 1102–03. 
 169. See Marcus Stern & Mark Arner, Police May Gain Power to Enforce 
Immigration: Plan Has Local Officers, Rights Groups on Edge, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel’s reversal of long-standing legal tradition); Cheryl W. Thompson, Some 
Envision Police Role in Immigration Issues, ORLANDO SENTINEL, APR. 4, 2002, at A7 
(same). 
 170. See Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Assistance by State and Local Police in 
Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 19 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 26, 26–27 (1996), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopo1a.htm (describing the role previously played by state and 
local police with respect to immigration enforcement). 
 171. See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.us 
doj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm (revealing that, in the 
wake of 9/11, the Office of Legal Counsel had concluded state and local police possess 
“inherent authority” to enforce immigration laws). 
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The so-called “war on terror” was invoked in 2001, 2002 and 
2003 to justify the entry of increasing quantities of civil immigration-
infraction information into the National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC) computer database.172 Local and state police throughout the 
United States regularly use the NCIC to run background checks on 
individuals whom they encounter in the course of their work, including 
those questioned during routine traffic stops.173 Individuals who are 
arrested and detained because of their NCIC record have little recourse 
to challenge its contents, and in some cases have been denied the 
opportunity to examine the record.174 
The involvement of local police forces in immigration enforcement 
is far from uniform. Almost seventy different U.S. jurisdictions, 
ranging from Alaska to California to Connecticut, have promulgated 
local rules prohibiting local police officers from inquiring into an 
individual’s immigration status.175 However, even in localities with 
rules or regulations prohibiting the use of local resources to enforce 
federal immigration law, some individual law-enforcement officers 
nonetheless run background checks on criminal suspects using the 
 
 172. See Wishnie, supra note 88, at 1086 (“In the AAI [Absconder 
Apprehension Initiative], the Service has begun reviewing the files of absconders to 
enter appropriate records into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database 
. . . .”). 
 173. See Nina Bernstein, Challenge in Connecticut Over Immigrants’ Arrest, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at B1; see also Nina Bernstein, Crime Database Misused 
for Civil Issues, Suit Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A34 (reporting on arrests in 
New York, Los Angeles, Boston, and other cities); Cam Simpson et al., Immigration 
Crackdown Shatters Muslims’ Lives, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2003, at C1 (reporting on 
the arrest of Amir Shah, a car wash supervisor found sleeping in a car waiting for 
business to open, by Schaumburg, Illinois, police officers, on the basis of Shah’s old 
deportation order). 
 174. See Complaint, El Badrawi v. DHS, supra note 113, ¶¶ 139–40. 
 175. See OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2001); H.R.J. 22, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Alaska 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/pdf/23/Bills/HJR022C.pdf); 
Detroit, Michigan, Local Res. (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
safefree/resources/17086res20021206.html; New Haven, Connecticut, Police Dep’t 
Gen. Order No. 06-2 (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.newhavenindependent.org/ 
archives/upload/2006/12/NHPDGeneralOrder.doc; City and County of San Francisco, 
Bd. of Supervisors Res. No. 389-02 (June 2002), available at http://www.democracy 
inaction.org/dia/organizationsORG/NILC/images/SanFranciscopdf.pdf; Philadelphia 
City Solicitor Memorandum to All City Commissioners and Department Heads (Oct. 
2003); National Immigration Law Center, Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted 
Across the U.S. Limiting Enforcement of Immigration Laws by State and Local 
Authorities, NILC.ORG, April 2008, http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/ 
locallaw_limiting_tbl_2008-04-15.pdf; For more information about different local 
initiatives to combat the encroachment of federal immigration enforcement, see 
generally http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources. 
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NCIC and hand detainees over to ICE.176 Moreover, law-enforcement 
authorities in some jurisdictions have actively sought to expand the role 
they play in immigration enforcement, either by developing 
independent local-enforcement policies177 or by arranging for local 
police to be “deputized” as immigration agents under section 287(g) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.178 
Since ICE launched its section 287(g) program in 2002, thirty-
eight memoranda of agreement with state and local law-enforcement 
agencies to participate in the program have been promulgated.179 In 
2007, ICE agents trained 426 state and local law-enforcement officers 
to undertake immigration enforcement.180 In March 2008, Secretary 
Chertoff claimed that in the previous two years, 287(g) agreements had 
accounted for the identification of approximately 26,000 individuals for 
potential deportation.181 At the same time, local and state police officers 
in countless other jurisdictions without any formal 287(g) agreement 
with ICE also continue to enforce immigration law through ad hoc 
inquiries and periodic use of the NCIC to run checks on individuals 
detained for nonimmigration infractions.182 In her recent testimony to 
the House Subcommittee on Immigration regarding the inquiry into 
 
 176. See, e.g., Ted Robbins, ‘America’s Toughest Sheriff’ Takes on 
Immigration, NPR.ORG, Mar. 10, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story/php?storyId=88002493 (“Though the Phoenix Police Department has a policy of 
not asking citizenship on arrest, down at the county jail, which houses prisoners from a 
number of jurisdictions, it’s a different matter. Every single person who is booked—
regardless of the charge—is asked their citizenship and social security number. Officials 
then look them up in the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, 
database.”). 
 177. See Kareem Fahim, Immigration Referrals by Police Draw Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, at A21 (describing New Jersey State Attorney General 
Milgram’s aggressive immigration referral policy). 
 178. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-562, 3009-563 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(g)) (adding section 287(g) to the Immigration and Nationality Act). Section 
287(g) authorizes the Attorney General to enter into agreements with state and local 
law-enforcement agencies, permitting designated officers to perform immigration law-
enforcement functions, pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement, provided that these 
officers receive appropriate training and function under the supervision of ICE officers. 
Id. 
 179. Chertoff Testimony, supra note 163; see also Jennifer V. Hughes, Police 
Seek Help in Criminal Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at WE2.  
 180. Chertoff Testimony, supra note 163. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See ICE.gov, ICE Factsheet, ICE Agreements of Cooperation in 
Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS), http://www.ice.gov/pi/ 
news/factsheets/access.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2008); see also ICE.gov, ICE 
Factsheet, Law Enforcement Support Center, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/ 
factsheets/lesc.htm?searchstring=NCIC (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).  
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alleged constitutional violations by ICE, attorney Kara Hartzler argued 
that this inconsistent pattern of enforcement often results in serious 
errors that cause lasting harm to the individuals involved.183 
The complexities and inconsistencies of the current system of 
immigration enforcement—where state and local actors who were 
previously discouraged from enforcing immigration laws are now 
encouraged to do so,184 individual officers who once believed that they 
should enforce immigration laws are now told that they should not,185 
and some police officers receive immigration training and others do 
not186—may help explain the increased incidence of allegations of 
violations of immigration respondents’ constitutional rights.187 
The rapid growth in the number of 287(g) agreements or local ad 
hoc initiatives in the past two years188 may also have contributed to the 
disproportionately rapid increase in the number of constitutional 
violations that have been reported by immigration respondents during 
the same period. Indeed, almost all of the examples of constitutional 
violations discussed in this Article arose during arrests and detentions 
that occurred during the last eighteen months.189 The situation has 
become so acute that at least one court of appeals has begun, sua 
sponte, to refer to the possibility that widespread violations of 
constitutional rights may be occurring. In early February 2008, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Melnitsenko 
v. Mukasey190 stated that establishing that an alleged constitutional 
violation was widespread could be grounds for suppression of evidence 
in removal proceedings, even though no widespread-violation claim had 
been made by the litigants in that case.191 The Second Circuit reiterated 
 
 183. See Hartzler Testimony, supra note 110, at 4 (“When local law 
enforcement untrained in immigration issues attempt to enforce complex immigration 
laws, errors often result. Sometimes these errors can lead to the detention of persons 
who are not deportable; other times, these mistakes can cause grave, long-term harm to 
the person involved.”). 
 184. See Hughes, supra note 179. 
 185. See, e.g., New Haven, Connecticut, Police Dep’t Gen. Order No. 06-2 
(Dec. 2006), available at http://www.newhavenindependent.org/ 
archives/upload/2006/12/NHPDGeneralOrder.doc. 
 186. See Hartzler Testimony, supra note 110, at 4.  
 187. Indeed, this exact turn of events was predicted by Professor Michael 
Wishnie, who, writing in 2003, suggested that “in a post-September 11 world in which 
the current administration has summoned state and local police untrained in the 
complexities of immigration law to the task of immigration enforcement, there is strong 
reason to expect that Fourth Amendment violations by police will become 
‘widespread.’” Wishnie, supra note 88, at 1114.  
 188. See supra text accompanying notes 175–183. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 105–159. 
 190. 517 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 191. Id. at 46–47. 
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this point in August 2008 in Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey,192 in which the 
Court noted that it was unable to consider a widespread-violation claim 
because petitioners had only raised the claim on appeal, but suggested 
that, had the claim been administratively exhausted, it would have been 
appropriate for the Court to consider.193 
In common with the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has also 
considered an increasing number of suppression cases in recent months 
and has recognized that, in many circumstances, violations of 
immigration respondents’ constitutional rights may warrant suppression 
of evidence and termination of proceedings. In one recent case, Lopez-
Rodriguez v. Mukasey,194 the Ninth Circuit held that it was appropriate 
to apply the exclusionary rule and suppress evidence obtained against 
immigration respondents that was the fruit of an illegal home raid.195 In 
so ruling, the court held that the mere fact that law-enforcement 
officers had entered the respondent’s home without a warrant, consent 
or exigent circumstances rendered the officers’ actions per se 
egregious.196 Judge Jay Bybee, concurring in the opinion, noted that the 
definition of egregious articulated in the holding of Lopez-Rodriguez 
and the decisions rendered in other similar Ninth Circuit cases had “set 
us on a collision course with the Supreme Court”197 as well as other 
circuits.198 A circuit split has clearly emerged, suggesting that the 
Supreme Court may soon be asked to grant certiorari to consider 
current understanding of the precedent of Lopez-Mendoza and 
reconsider the currency and efficacy of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings. 
Constitutional violations should therefore now be considered as 
both geographically widespread—ranging widely across geographical 
boundaries—and institutionally widespread—the result of behavior by 
law-enforcement officers operating at the federal, state and local levels. 
The Lopez-Mendoza Court stated that “[o]ur conclusions concerning 
the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there developed good 
 
 192. 540 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 193. Id. at 130 n.2 (“In their submissions to the Court, petitioners argue for the 
first time that Fourth Amendment violations by immigration authorities are so 
widespread as to make exclusion appropriate in these circumstances. Because they did 
not raise the issue before the BIA, it has not been exhausted and is therefore not 
appropriately before us.”). 
 194. 536 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 195. Id. at 1018–19. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1019–20 (Bybee, J., concurring). 
 198. See id. at 1020 n.1 (Bybee, J., concurring) (describing the differences 
between the standard for egregiousness in the Ninth Circuit when contrasted to the First 
and Second Circuits). 
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reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers 
were widespread.”199 The current pattern of immigration enforcement 
strongly suggests that this may now be the case, and recent case law 
emerging from different circuits suggests that now may be the time for 
the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Lopez-Mendoza in light of 
those changed circumstances. 
III. 1984–2009: THE EROSION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF  
LOPEZ-MENDOZA 
In the face of this widespread increase in the number of reports of 
violations of immigration respondents’ constitutional rights, the U.S. 
government, as well as some commentators and scholars, argue that the 
exclusionary rule need not be reintroduced in immigration 
proceedings.200 The rationale advanced by opponents of the use of the 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings typically mirrors the text 
of the Lopez-Mendoza opinion: first, they argue that immigration 
proceedings are civil in nature and therefore immigration respondents 
do not need the full protections of the criminal-justice system;201 
second, they argue that immigration officers undergo extensive training 
which ensures that they avoid violating respondents’ rights;202 and 
finally, they suggest that other remedies are available to individuals 
with a genuine grievance against the authorities.203 However, while 
 
 199. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
 200. A wider debate is also currently taking place about the applicability of the 
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings. Recently there have been articles in the 
media suggesting that the Supreme Court should reconsider whether to continue to 
employ the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, U.S. 
Stands Alone in Rejecting All Evidence When Police Err, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2008, 
at A1. Speculation about the Supreme Court’s attitude toward the exclusionary rule has 
increased since certiorari was granted in United States v. Herring, 492 F.3d 1212 (11th 
Cir. 2007), a case which addresses whether the deterrent effect of excluding evidence 
obtained as a result of negligent error by law-enforcement personnel outweighs the 
costs of excluding such evidence, or whether the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule should be extended. Id. Although this wider debate about the 
exclusionary rule raises a number of important questions, it is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 201. See Ward, supra note 89, at 50. Michael Neifach, ICE’s principal legal 
advisor, reiterated this stance in a recent article, claiming that “[a] deportation hearing 
is purely a civil action to determine a person’s eligibility to remain in this country . . . . 
Therefore the purpose of the hearing is not to punish past crime but rather the 
continuing violation of immigration laws.” Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Matthew S. Mulqueen, Note, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1157, 1194–95 (2008) (arguing 
that, despite jurists and commentators’ arguments to the contrary, alternative remedies 
are inadequate). 
ELIAS - FINAL 1/28/2009 9:19 AM 
2008:1109 Good Reason to Believe 1141 
these three arguments may have resonated in 1984—although there is 
also some suggestion that, even then, they were not universally 
accepted204—they no longer appear to be in step with immigration 
jurisprudence, the practice of immigration enforcement, or the realities 
of life for immigrant communities in 2009. The third and final Part of 
this Article will explore the changes that have occurred over the past 
twenty-five years and will demonstrate why the most frequently raised 
arguments against the reintroduction of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings are now unavailing. 
A. The Criminalization of Civil Deportation Proceedings 
The Court’s neat distinction in Lopez-Mendoza between civil and 
criminal proceedings relied upon longstanding notions that, because the 
costs and consequences for respondents in civil proceedings were much 
lower than for criminal defendants, procedural protections deemed vital 
in the criminal-justice system were less important in civil 
proceedings.205 However, in the twenty-five years since the Court’s 
decision in Lopez-Mendoza, the boundary line between civil and 
criminal immigration proceedings has become increasingly blurred.206 
 
 204. See Ward, supra note 89, at 50 (“When Lopez-Mendoza was decided, 
complaints about government immigration arrest practices were similar to those of 
today, according to Mary L. Heen, who argued the Supreme Court case on behalf of 
Lopez-Mendoza and the other detainees. Even then there was a concern, Heen says, 
that as immigration enforcement efforts increased, the sweeps became too broad, 
violating the rights of citizens and lawful residents. ‘We knew that there was cause for 
skepticism about alternatives such as internal INS training and disciplinary processes 
being an effective deterrent against Fourth Amendment violations,’ says Heen, who is 
now a professor at the University of Richmond School of Law.”). 
 205. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he reason for different standards of proof in civil as opposed to 
criminal litigation [is] apparent. In a civil suit between two private parties for money 
damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for there to be an 
erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in 
the plaintiff’s favor . . . . In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not view the 
social disutility of convicting an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of 
acquitting someone who is guilty.”). Harlan’s view has its roots in longstanding 
common-law traditions of procedural safeguards in criminal trials, for, as Blackstone 
wrote, “better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352. 
 206. See, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration 
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 660 (2003); Juliet Stumpf, 
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 367 (2006) (exposing a common link that has increasingly come to unite these two 
once discrete fields of law); see also Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of 
Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
669, 671 (1997) (“Increasingly, the United States has looked to the criminal law to 
address the problem of undocumented immigration.”). Recent scholarship suggests that 
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This line blurring has led to the creation of new immigration-related 
crimes,207 an increase in the minimum and maximum sentences for 
existing immigration crimes,208 an increase in the fines imposed on 
immigrant defendants,209 and far greater numbers of prosecutions being 
brought for the commission of all immigration-related crimes.210 Recent 
data suggest that immigration-related cases account for the largest 
single category of federal prosecutions, constituting 57 percent of all 
new federal criminal cases in March 2008.211 Localities throughout the 
United States have also introduced an unprecedented number of 
measures designed to criminalize an undocumented individual’s mere 
 
this line blurring is not just visible in immigration law and criminal law, but also 
apparent in the intersection of many other aspects of criminal and civil procedure. See 
Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 79 (2008). 
 207. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.) (rendering individuals convicted of minor crimes with 
sentences of less than five years eligible for deportation); Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.) (making it a criminal offense for 
a noncitizen to attempt an unlawful reentry into the United States after having been 
convicted of three misdemeanors involving either drugs or crimes against the person); 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 121(b)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 4989 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1325(d)) (imposing criminal penalties on those who 
establish commercial enterprises for the purpose of evading immigration laws). 
 208. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-322, § 60024, 108 Stat. 1796, 1981 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 
1324) (enhancing penalties for smuggling noncitizens); id. § 130001(b), 108 Stat. at 
2023 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1)) (establishing criminal penalties 
for noncitizens who attempt to reenter the United States unlawfully after having been 
convicted of three misdemeanors involving either drugs or crimes against the person); 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471 
(codified as amended at 1028 U.S.C. § 1326) (increasing the criminal sentences for the 
offenses of unlawful reentry after deportation, if deportation resulted from a felony 
(more if the underlying crime was an “aggravated felony”)). 
 209. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1282, 1325–28 (2006) (increasing criminal fines 
for certain immigration-related crimes). 
 210. Justice Department statistics show an almost tripling of prosecutions for 
immigration felonies and class A misdemeanors from 1984–94. See Helen Morris, Zero 
Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1317, 1318 (1997) (showing an increase of immigration felonies and Class A 
misdemeanors prosecuted in federal court from 1,186 in 1984 to 3,477 in 1994); see 
also Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the 
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 655 (2004) 
(“The total number of prosecutions for immigration offenses has risen dramatically in 
the past decade from 14,854 in 1994 to 23,852 in 2002.”). 
 211. See Julia Preston, More Illegal Crossings Are Criminal Cases, Group 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at A14. 
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presence.212 Commentators have characterized this trend as the 
“criminalization of immigration law,”213 or “crimmigration.”214 This 
trend has accelerated markedly in the wake of September 11, 2001,215 
reaching its apex this year with the Justice Department’s recent 
announcement that criminal immigration cases filed by the federal 
government in February 2008 accounted for a majority of all new 
Justice Department prosecutions nationwide.216 
Yet, while the immigration-law system has adopted many of the 
punitive attributes of the criminal-law system, such as harsher 
sentences, higher fines, and greater numbers of federal prosecutions, it 
has failed to adopt the procedural checks and balances that protect 
criminal defendants from arbitrary or unconstitutional applications of 
the law. This imbalance has been described as an “asymmetric 
incorporation of criminal justice norms”217 into the immigration-law 
system.218 As Professor Stephen Legomsky explains: 
A pattern has emerged: Those features of the criminal justice 
model that can roughly be classified as enforcement have 
indeed been imported. Those that relate to adjudication—in 
particular, the bundle of procedural rights recognized in 
 
 212. Damian Cave, Local Officials Adopt New, Harder Tactics on Illegal 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at A1 (“In 2007, 1,562 bills related to illegal 
immigration were introduced nationwide and 240 were enacted in 46 states, triple the 
number that passed in 2006, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures. 
A new law in Mississippi makes it a felony for an illegal immigrant to hold a job. In 
Oklahoma, sheltering or transporting illegal immigrants is also a felony.”). 
 213. See Miller, supra note 206, at 617 (defining the criminalization of 
immigration law as “a general way of describing the closer relationship that has 
developed” between the criminal justice and immigration systems); see also Morris, 
supra note 210, at 1317 (“One of the most striking aspects of immigration law in the 
past decade is its increased criminalization.”). 
 214. Stumpf, supra note 206, at 368. 
 215. See, e.g., Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between 
Immigration and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 
83–95 (2005) (exploring post-9/11 changes in the interaction between criminal and 
immigration regulations). 
 216. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Prosecutions Hit New High: Critics Say 
Increased Use of Criminal Charges Strains System, WASH. POST, June 2, 2008, at A1. 
This trend is a result of “Operation Streamline,” a new initiative in which prosecutors 
file minor criminal charges against any individuals detained while attempting to cross 
the border, thereby criminalizing ostensibly civil deportation proceedings. Id. 
 217.  Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric 
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 523 (2007). 
 218. Id. at 471 (“There is an embryonic literature on the growing convergence 
of two critical regulatory regimes—criminal justice and immigration control.”); see also 
Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil 
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1499–1505 (2002). 
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criminal cases—have been consciously rejected . . . . 
[I]mmigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, 
perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model 
while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a 
civil regulatory regime.219 
The stakes are no longer significantly lower in the immigration-law 
system than in the criminal-justice system. As Legomsky argues, 
“When the personal stakes are high, the risk of error should be kept 
correspondingly low. Asymmetric incorporation has given immigration 
law precisely the opposite.”220 
The absence of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings 
may be particularly harmful for individuals facing criminal prosecution 
who are subsequently put into immigration proceedings, or vice versa. 
For many immigration respondents who are also criminal defendants, 
the line between criminal and immigration proceedings has become so 
blurred as to be meaningless. A recent case in Oklahoma, Ochoa v. 
Bass,221 indicates the extent to which the distinction between 
immigration and criminal proceedings has also become hazy for 
members of the judiciary.222 Oklahoma County District Judge Jerry D. 
Bass decided to question criminal defendants on trial for rape, assault 
and battery, and cocaine possession about their immigration status.223 
The criminal defendants were not facing any immigration charges.224 
Nonetheless, “[a]s a result of that questioning Judge Bass, sua sponte, 
entered orders committing the custody of each Petitioner to the county 
sheriff” on immigration, rather than criminal, grounds.225 When 
challenged, Judge Bass argued that this behavior was justified because 
of a local requirement that “all agencies within this state . . . fully 
cooperate with federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of 
federal immigration laws.”226 
 
 219. Legomsky, supra note 217, at 472. 
 220. Id. at 524. 
 221. 2008 OK CR 11, 181 P.3d 727. 
 222. See id. 
 223. Id. ¶¶ 1–4. 
 224. See id.  
 225. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
 226. Id. ¶¶ 5–7 (citing Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, 
2007 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 112, § 2, at 547). A considerable number of jurisdictions 
have similar local reporting requirements. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, 
IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE (2007), available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/TheDebate/EnforcementLocalPolice/Bac
kgrounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf. Many more require local police officers to 
check on the immigration status of individuals in police custody. See, e.g., Jerry 
Markon, Judge Dismisses Suit on Illegal Immigration: Crackdown Could Still Face 
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Ochoa demonstrates that immigration status can and does 
fundamentally affect the outcomes for defendants facing criminal 
charges. Even more far reaching is the effect that criminal history, or 
evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investigation, can have 
upon the outcomes for respondents in removal proceedings. Under 
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),227 any 
criminal history (no matter how minor) may affect whether an 
individual detained by ICE is eligible to be released on bond, the 
amount of the bond, the opportunities for relief available to that 
individual, and the likelihood that the individual will be deported.228 
Furthermore, even if the only criminal allegations against an 
immigration respondent arise solely from evidence obtained during an 
illegal search and seizure by immigration authorities, and criminal 
charges cannot be brought because the exclusionary rule prevents the 
presentation of that evidence to a criminal court, that allegation is still 
admissible “collaterally” in immigration court.229 
Alternatively, even immigration respondents who appear likely to 
prevail in motions to suppress and terminate proceedings because of 
constitutional violations by the law-enforcement officers who arrested 
them may nonetheless be charged with committing criminal offenses, 
 
Challenge, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2007, at B3 (reporting about Prince William County’s 
“crackdown on illegal immigration, which requires police to check the immigration 
status of people in custody”). 
 227. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Immigration Marriage Fraud Act Amendments of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, (as amended by the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359). 
 228. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 240(a), Pub. L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 204 (as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272; and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229)); see also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 
245, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 217 (as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272; and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
116 Stat. 2135 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255)). 
 229. See, e.g., Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 
2004) (holding that police actions were not egregious violations of Fourth Amendment, 
so the exclusionary rule did not apply in deportation proceedings); U.S. v. Del Toro 
Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a defendant’s identity was 
not suppressible); U.S. v. Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
information regarding a defendant’s identity was not suppressible); see generally The 
Exclusionary Rule, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 193 (2007). 
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even when the only evidence available was a fruit of the original, 
allegedly illegal, immigration arrest. This is exactly what happened in a 
recent case in Minnesota in which respondents testified in immigration 
court about numerous constitutional violations committed by police 
officers at the time of their arrest.230 As respondents were leaving the 
immigration court building, they were rearrested by the very same 
police officers on criminal charges based solely upon evidence gathered 
during the first, allegedly unconstitutional, immigration arrest.231 This 
state of affairs is a far cry from the “purely civil action” to which the 
Lopez-Mendoza majority held that the exclusionary rule need not 
apply.232 
B. The Inefficacy of ICE’s Internal Rules as a Deterrent 
In 1984, the Supreme Court placed great faith in the efficacy of 
INS internal rules and procedures to deter immigration officials from 
violating respondents’ constitutional rights. In the twenty-five years 
since Lopez-Mendoza was decided, the Justice Department’s internal 
regulations have failed to prevent behavior by immigration officers that 
violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.233 ICE inherited a number 
of regulations from its predecessor, INS, that are designed to protect 
respondents in immigration proceedings from being subjected to 
unconstitutional searches, seizures, arrests, and detentions.234 
Nonetheless, a considerable number of cases have been litigated in 
 
 230. See Email from Rachel Bengtson, Immigration Attorney, Centro Legal, 
Inc. in St. Paul, MN to National Immigration Project (Mar. 4, 2008, 14:28 CST) (“Our 
client . . . described how, when he came to the door in his undergarments at 6:00 in the 
morning, opened the door less than a foot and looked out, he saw 5 men reaching for 
their guns as they pushed open the side door to his house and forced their way inside. 
He also described how ICE agents took him into an empty bedroom, turned off the 
lights and shut the door to interrogate him. One agent picked up a wooden bench and 
slammed it down on the floor inches away from his face and said, ‘tell me the truth!’ 
Although the testimony made clear numerous Constitutional violations committed by 
ICE officers during the raid, our clients were nevertheless arrested afterward. The 
Willmar police department, who we are also suing for participating in the home 
invasion raids, has charged both of our clients with forgery and identity theft, based on 
the evidence illegally obtained by ICE.”).  
 231. See id. 
 232. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 1050–51 (1984). 
 233. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction—The Border Crossed Us: 
Current Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE. 389, 392–93 
(2004) (presenting evidence that “INS regularly raids worksites engaged in a labor 
controversy” in violation of agency guidelines, contradicting “the Lopez-Mendoza 
majority’s premise that agency rules alone adequately deter abusive INS raid 
practices”). 
 234. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.1–.12 (2008). 
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which the complainants allege that ICE agents have disregarded these 
regulations and constitutional violations have occurred. 
Regulations prohibit ICE agents from using unreasonable and 
disproportionate force during the interrogation, arrest, and detention of 
a suspect.235 Yet, in the past two years a number of complaints have 
been filed alleging that ICE agents and law-enforcement officers used 
unreasonable and disproportionate force during the interrogation, 
arrest, and detention of civil immigration suspects.236 Regulations state 
that individuals may not be detained and subjected to custodial 
interrogation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that they have 
committed an immigration violation.237 Yet, in the same two-year 
period, a small but significant number of motions to suppress evidence 
and terminate proceedings have been brought by respondents alleging 
that they were detained by immigration officers who could not have had 
any reasonable suspicion to believe that they had committed 
immigration infractions.238 Regulations specify that ICE officers may 
 
 235. Id. § 287.8(a)(iii) (obligating ICE agents to use “the minimum non-deadly 
force necessary to accomplish the officer’s mission and shall escalate to a higher level 
of non-deadly force only when such higher level of force is warranted by the actions, 
apparent intentions, and apparent capabilities of the suspect, prisoner, or assailant”). 
 236. See, e.g., Motion to Suppress and/or Terminate Proceedings for 
Violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and Agency Regulations and Memo of 
Points and Authorities, In re Chicas Moran, supra note 125 (“[A]s I was about to leave 
for my job . . . I was stopped inside my apartment by about five armed men. These 
men threw me and my roommates down on the floor and handcuffed us.”). Other suits 
have been filed alleging that ICE agents and law-enforcement officers used force, or 
displays of force, to enter residential premises without consent. See Jury Demand, 
Flores-Morales v. George, supra note 129; Plaintiff-Intervenor’s Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Martinez v. Chertoff, supra 
note 127. 
 237. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1) (“An immigration officer, like any other person, 
has the right to ask questions of anyone as long as the immigration officer does not 
restrain the freedom of an individual, not under arrest, to walk away.”); id. § 
287.8(b)(2) (stipulating that an immigration officer may briefly detain an individual 
only if the officer “has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that 
the person being questioned is, or is attempting to be, engaged in an offense against the 
United States or is an alien illegally in the United States”). 
 238. See, e.g., Motion to Suppress Evidence and Terminate Proceeding with 
Supporting Memorandum of Law, In re Cervantes-Valerio, supra note 129 (“[T]here 
was no reasonable basis for the initial decision to follow the Respondent, or continuing 
to follow the Respondent for ten (10) miles, or conducting a custodial interrogation of 
the Respondent.”); Affidavit of Jose Ordonez-Salanec, supra note 130, ¶ 1 (“At the 
time of my arrest [by the Border Patrol], I had violated no traffic law, all of the 
inspection stickers on the vehicle that I was driving were current, and there were no 
warrants for my arrest that would have justified the stop and arrest.”); Graves 
Testimony, supra note 117, at 2–3 (“There was no legitimate reason. There was no 
probable cause. Our plant—our workplace—had been transformed into a prison or 
detention center.”).  
ELIAS - FINAL 1/28/2009 9:19 AM 
1148 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
not enter residential premises without either a judicially approved 
search warrant or consent by the occupants of the premises.239 Yet, in 
many recent cases, immigration respondents have filed motions to 
suppress evidence obtained during illegal, warrantless, and 
nonconsensual searches of their homes.240 In one instance an ICE agent, 
when asked to produce a valid search warrant before entering 
residential premises, informed the inhabitants (incorrectly) that he did 
not need a search warrant to enter their home.241 
The Lopez-Mendoza majority emphasized the training scheme 
adopted by INS to ensure that immigration officers adhered to their 
regulations,242 and present-day advocates of ICE similarly argue that 
ICE’s current training regime deters violations of immigration 
respondents’ fundamental rights.243 This claim is not borne out by 
recent case law. The case of Pedro Guzman provides a particularly 
salient example of the extent to which ICE’s training procedures fail to 
guarantee that immigration officers will follow the agency’s guidelines 
and therefore fail to prevent violations of individuals’ constitutional 
rights. Guzman, a U.S. citizen with learning difficulties, was 
apprehended by the Los Angeles police on a trespassing and vandalism 
charge, handed over to ICE, and mistakenly deported to Mexico.244 
Guzman survived for three months wandering along the border, eating 
garbage and bathing in the Tijuana River before finally convincing a 
 
 239. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (“An immigration officer may not enter into . . . a 
residence including the curtilage of such residence . . . for the purpose of questioning 
the occupants . . . concerning their right to be or remain in the United States unless the 
officer has either a warrant or the consent of the owner or other person in control of the 
site to be inspected.”). 
 240. See, e.g., Complaint, Mancha v. ICE, supra note 115, ¶¶ 24–34; Mancha 
Testimony, supra note 115; Affidavit of Gonzalo Juarez, supra note 123, ¶¶ 2–4, 7–9 
(“The officer told me to ‘come inside.’ He did not ask me for permission to enter. I 
never gave permission for him to enter.”); Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages to 
Remedy Civil Rights Violations and Common Law Torts, Border Network for Human 
Rights v. County of Otero, supra note 124, ¶ 10 (“Defendants began targeting Hispanic 
families in their own homes by initiating random sweeps of trailers in the area . . . .”). 
 241. Ward, supra note 89, at 44 (“When federal immigration and local 
Minnesota law enforcement agents entered several homes in Willmar in which undoc-
umented workers were thought to be living, they were asked to show a search warrant. 
‘We don’t need one,’ was one agent’s response during last year’s raid, according to a 
wrongful search action filed last April by 53 plaintiffs in federal court in 
Minneapolis.”). 
 242. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1043 (1984) (“New 
immigration officers receive instruction and examination in Fourth Amendment law, 
and others receive periodic refresher courses in law.”).  
 243. See Ward, supra note 89, at 47. 
 244. See Randal C. Archibold, Deported in Error, Missing and Months Later 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at A16. 
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border official to allow him to reenter the United States.245 Guzman’s 
case is but one of many examples of U.S. citizens being inadvertently 
deported.246 Professor Kanstroom has characterized this phenomenon as 
indicative of the “basic lack of care” that ICE is taking in this, and 
other areas—including adherence to the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments—when conducting immigration raids.247 
ICE’s institutional response to these allegations of violations of 
INS legacy rules and regulations is that INS regulations are no longer 
relevant. In at least one case, ICE attorneys argued that ICE agents are 
not legally bound by INS rules and regulations because ICE is a new, 
distinct agency that need not adhere to INS legacy subregulatory rules 
and guidelines.248 The immigration-defense bar has vigorously opposed 
this argument.249 The arguments made by both sides in this dispute 
indicate the degree to which regulatory oversight of immigration 
enforcement has changed since Lopez-Mendoza was decided in 1984. If 
the immigration-defense bar is correct, the regulations relied upon by 
the Lopez-Mendoza majority to serve as a check against 
unconstitutional conduct by immigration officers are currently failing to 
perform that function. If ICE’s attorneys are correct, the INS 
regulations designed to prevent violations of immigration respondents’ 
 
 245. See Jacqueline Stevens, Amid Anti-Immigrant Fervor, ICE Deporting 
More American Citizens, NATION, Nov. 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.alternet.org/immigration/87467.  
 246. See id.  
 247. Ward, supra note 89, at 47 (reporting that Kanstroom emphasized 
Guzman’s case is far from unique in that “‘[w]e’re finding more cases of U.S. citizens 
who get swept up in these raids, and it indicates the basic lack of care the agency is 
taking . . . . If they’re deporting U.S. citizens by mistake, it’s not a stretch to assume 
they’re making other mistakes as well’”). 
 248. See Response to Motion to Suppress Evidence and Terminate, In re X, at 
25–26 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review Nov. 28, 2007) 
(on file with author) (claiming that ICE was not bound by rules mandating respect for 
immigration suspects’ constitutional rights laid out in INS Manual M-69 because the 
manual was “an outdated publication . . . belonging to an abolished agency . . . .”). 
The argument that ICE need not adhere to its predecessor agency’s rules and 
regulations directly contravenes one of the guiding principles of administrative law, in 
accordance with which the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 
Stat. 2135 (which created the Department of Homeland Security) transferred all of 
INS’s detention and removal functions to DHS. See id. § 441, 116 Stat. at 2192 
(codified as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 251) (“[T]here shall be transferred from the 
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization to the Under Secretary for Border and 
Transportation Security all functions performed under the following programs . . . . 
The detention and removal program.”). 
 249.  See, e.g., Respondent’s Reply to the Government’s Brief Opposing the 
Suppression of Evidence and Opposing Termination of Removal Proceedings, In the 
Matter of X, at 43–44 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with author).  
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constitutional rights, and relied on by the Court in Lopez-Mendoza to 
perform that function, are no longer in force. In either case, at least 
some of the ground on which the Lopez-Mendoza majority rested in 
1984 has worn away by 2009. 
In reaction to the proliferation of regulatory violations by 
immigration officers, some courts of appeal and immigration courts 
have acknowledged that, in cases where regulations or rules that 
implicate fundamental constitutional rights have been violated, 
immigration proceedings should be terminated.250 However, the BIA 
and courts in other jurisdictions continue to adhere to the strict standard 
established in Lopez-Mendoza of allowing proceedings to continue and 
individuals to be deported, even when immigration officers have 
disregarded their own rules and regulations and violated respondents’ 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.251 
C. The Inadequacy of Civil Suits as a Remedy 
In 1984, Justice White, writing in dissent in Lopez-Mendoza, 
observed that “[t]he suggestion that alternative remedies, such as civil 
suits, provide adequate protection is unrealistic” because of the 
powerlessness of poor, uneducated individuals who are harmed by 
constitutional violations that occur in the course of immigration 
enforcement.252 Justice White’s words have proven to be prescient.253 
Although the arguments advanced by government officials about the 
availability of alternative remedies for wronged immigration 
respondents remain largely the same today as they were in 1984, the 
 
 250. See Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 461 F.3d 290, 296–97 (2d Cir. 2006); 
see also In re Herrera-Priego, Decision and Order of the Immigration Judge, supra note 
125, at 21–24 (finding that ICE’s violation of an internal operations instruction that was 
transferred to the Special Agent’s Field Manual and that was designed to protect 
Respondent’s fundamental rights is grounds for termination of proceedings). 
 251. See, e.g., In re Hernandez, Interim Decision #3265, 21 I. & N. Dec. 224, 
228 (BIA 1996) (holding that an “Immigration Judge, where possible, can and should 
take corrective action short of termination of the proceedings” where there has been a 
violation of a DHS regulation). 
 252. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 253. In a case brought just one year after Lopez-Mendoza was decided, in 
which an application was made for injunctive relief against repeated home invasions by 
immigration officers, the court granted the relief, noting that damage actions were 
especially unlikely to be brought because of the vulnerability of the population 
involved. See LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985) (dealing with a suit 
against INS officials by migrant farm workers, alleging that the INS regularly searched 
migrant housing without warrants or even articulable suspicion that illegal aliens were 
present). 
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situation of the respondents themselves has changed radically over the 
past twenty-five years. 
The vulnerability, social isolation and legal marginalization of 
immigrant communities has increased since 1984, with marked 
increases occurring in two distinct phases.254 The first phase began in 
1990 when the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,255 and the second phase began in late 2001, in the aftermath 
of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.256 The jurisprudential and statutory 
developments during these two periods have made it harder for an 
immigration respondent whose constitutional rights have been violated 
to seek redress through civil proceedings. 
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not necessitate suppression of evidence obtained by 
U.S. law-enforcement officers during an illegal, warrantless search of a 
Mexican citizen’s home in Mexico.257 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, claimed that “‘the people’ protected by the Fourth 
Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with 
this country to be considered part of that community.”258 
In the wake of Verdugo-Urquidez, the applicability of Fourth 
Amendment protections to both legal residents and undocumented 
immigrants in criminal and civil proceedings has been questioned by 
some courts.259 Scholarly debate over the applicability of the Verdugo-
Urquidez holding to proceedings involving undocumented individuals 
present in the United States has been even more extensive and heated.260 
 
 254. See generally Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667 (2003). Part III.C of this Article owes a considerable debt to 
Professor Wishnie’s scholarship in this area. 
 255. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 256. See generally Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and 
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the 
United States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
609 (2005); Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Aliens” in Our Midst Post-
9/11: Legislating Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683 
(2005). 
 257. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259. 
 258. Id. at 265. 
 259. See, e.g., United States v. Guitterez, No. CR 96-40075 SBA, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16446, at *16–18 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez in denying 
motion to suppress on grounds that criminal defendant was an undocumented immigrant 
and not covered by the Fourth Amendment); Torres v. State, 818 S.W.2d 141, 143 n.1 
(Tex. App. 1991) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez and holding undocumented defendant may 
not raise a Fourth Amendment objection to search or seizure). 
 260. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kurek, United States v. Guitterez: A Functional 
Approach to a Vexing Issue, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 359, 381 (1999) (criticizing the 
“significant voluntary connections” test of Verdugo-Urquidez as inconsistent); Victor 
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The most far-reaching interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez would 
suggest that noncitizens have no Fourth Amendment rights.261 Such an 
interpretation would render noncitizens powerless to seek declaratory 
relief for alleged Fourth Amendment violations by law-enforcement 
officers and would dispel the Lopez-Mendoza majority’s argument that 
declaratory relief constitutes an adequate alternative to the exclusionary 
rule. Even more attenuated interpretations of Verdugo-Urquidez lend at 
least some degree of support to Justice White’s position in his dissent in 
Lopez-Mendoza that relatively powerless immigration respondents 
would have difficulty vindicating their Fourth Amendment rights 
through a civil process rather than through the protections provided by 
the exclusionary rule.262 
In the wake of 9/11, a number of statutory measures and agency 
schemes were introduced that further restricted the rights of aliens held 
by the federal government.263 However, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence during the 1990s also reflected a diminishing concern 
 
C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: 
On Guitterez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 57, 60–61 (2000) (suggesting that Verdugo-Urquidez affects the application of the 
Fourth Amendment to noncitizens facing prosecution in United States courts); Michael 
Scaperlanda, The Domestic Fourth Amendment Rights of Aliens: To What Extent Do 
They Survive United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez?, 56 MO. L. REV. 213, 228 (1991) 
(criticizing the textual exegesis of the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality as “strained” and in 
contradiction with earlier Supreme Court precedent); René L. Valladares & James G. 
Connell, III, Search and Seizure Protections for Undocumented Aliens: The 
Territoriality and Voluntary Presence Principles in Fourth Amendment Law, 34 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1293, 1295, 1333 (1997) (acknowledging that various commentators 
have “properly criticized” Verdugo-Urquidez and “[t]he existence of a Fourth 
Amendment violation must be determined from the circumstances of the search, and not 
from the immigration status of the person searched”); Joseph Ricchezza, Note, Are 
Undocumented Aliens “People” Persons Within the Context of the Fourth 
Amendment?, 5 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 499 (1991) (describing the reasoning of 
Verdugo-Urquidez as a “morass”). 
  261. At least one court has gone nearly this far. See United States v. Esparza-
Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1255 (N.D. Utah 2003) (“The court concludes that as 
a previously-removed alien felon, Esparza-Mendoza cannot assert a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment because he is not one of ‘the People’ the Amendment protects.”). 
For a discussion of the implications of this decision, see M. Isabel Medina, 
Ruminations on the Fourth Amendment: Case Law, Commentary, and the Word 
“Citizen,” 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 189 (2008). 
 262. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1055 (1984) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 263. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); 
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, 8 C.F.R. § 264.1 (2008); 
Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney Gen. to Comm’r Immigration and 
Naturalization Serv. 1–2, (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs 
/docs/doj/abscndr012502mem.pdf. 
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with the violation of aliens’ constitutional rights. For example, in Reno 
v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,264 the Court held 
that First Amendment arguments were unavailing when made by 
immigrants singled out for deportation on the basis of disfavored speech 
and associational activities.265 Professor Michael Wishnie argues that 
Verdugo-Urquidez may also have influenced both the Reno holding and 
the post-9/11 legislation,266 permitting deportation of immigrants on the 
grounds of speech,267 political affiliation,268 and family connections.269 
In the twenty-five years since Lopez-Mendoza, statutory 
provisions and case law have eroded almost all of the options for 
meaningful judicial review that were once available to immigration 
respondents whose constitutional rights have been violated. The 1996 
amendments to the INA limited judicial review of removal proceedings, 
leaving the petition-for-review process as the primary opportunity for 
recourse.270 The Court’s construction of INA section 242(g) in Reno 
 
 264. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 265. Id. at 471; see also Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment 
After Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of 
Rights for Aliens?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 205 (2000) (“[In Reno the 
Court] implied that aliens who were unlawfully present in the United States did not 
enjoy the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 266. Wishnie, supra note 254, at 682–83 (discussing the USA PATRIOT 
ACT). 
 267. Id. (citing Reno, which rejected a challenge to deportation of Palestinian 
activists based on speech and associational activities). 
 268. Id. at 683 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (establishing 
“membership” in certain organizations as grounds for inadmissibility); id. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)–(V) (defining to engage in terrorist activity as including 
solicitation of funds or recruitment of personnel)). 
 269. Id. (“[Any alien who] is the spouse or child of an alien who is 
inadmissible [as terrorist] . . . is inadmissible.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII))). These modern antiterrorism immigration provisions follow a 
long, often shameful, history of singling out immigrants for deportation based on their 
disfavored speech or association. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 
(1952) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the deportation of alleged members of 
the Communist Party); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (vacating a deportation 
order that had been based on a labor activist’s alleged membership in and affiliation 
with Communist Party); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) 
(invalidating denaturalization proceeding brought on grounds that citizen was a 
Communist at the time of application for citizenship); United States ex rel. Turner v. 
Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to an exclusion 
order against an anarchist). 
 270. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 381(a), 110 Stat 3009-546, 3009-650 (revising 
section 279 of the INA, which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1329 and which some courts 
had previously held was an independent cause of action against the INS); id. § 
306(b)(9) (amending INA §  242(b)(9)); see generally Lenni B. Benson, Back to the 
Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 
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effectively ruled out First Amendment actions by immigration 
respondents.271 In 2008, the Bush administration argued that INA 
section 242 prevents immigration respondents from bringing Bivens 
claims for damages,272 and the Second Circuit found that it does not 
have jurisdiction to hear claims under the Torture Victim Protection 
Act by nonresident aliens who were mistreated by U.S. officials and 
removed to nations where they were subjected to torture.273 The 
opportunities available to immigration respondents to vindicate their 
constitutional rights by bringing a civil action were already scant in 
1984 and have become even more so in 2009.274 
In the years since Lopez-Mendoza, immigrant groups have become 
increasingly disconnected from the American legal system. Whether or 
not Justice White was correct in observing that it was unrealistic in 
1984 to expect that financially disadvantaged individuals, with limited 
English skills and fear of the authorities, would be willing to come 
forward and seek recompense for wrongs they had suffered by bringing 
civil suits,275 there is no doubt that in the post-9/11 environment (which 
has stripped immigrant communities of many of the protections they 
previously enjoyed), Justice White’s concerns are even more relevant. 
 
CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997); Lenni B. Benson, The “New World” of Judicial Review 
of Removal Orders, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233 (1998); Nancy Morawetz, 
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of 
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial 
Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After 
the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000). 
 271. 525 U.S. 471, 471 (1999). 
 272. See Answer, Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07-cv-01436 (D. Conn. filed 
Nov. 26, 2007) (on file with author); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 273. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 162–64 (2d Cir. 2008). Arar, a dual 
citizen of Syria and Canada, alleged that he was mistreated by U.S. officials in the 
United States and removed to Syria with the knowledge or intention that Syrian 
authorities would interrogate him under torture. Id. at 162–63. He brought an action 
against the United States and various U.S. officials pursuant to the Torture Victim 
Protection Act and the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 163. The 
Second Circuit held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reach Arar’s 
other claims. Id. at 164. 
 274. Although there are incidences of individuals seeking redress, they appear 
to be limited to the wealthy few able to afford legal representation. Ward, supra note 
89, at 49 (“Philip Kim Hwang, a San Francisco lawyer who practices with the 
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, says over the last 10 years his organization has 
settled eight lawsuits alleging officer misconduct against the federal immigration 
authorities, resulting in plaintiffs being awarded a total of $642,500 in claims . . . . ‘In 
most cases they don’t formally acknowledge that there was wrongdoing but they pay 
out a significant amount, which is the government’s de facto acknowledgment that there 
was a mess-up,’ Hwang says.”). 
 275. See supra text accompanying note 107. 
ELIAS - FINAL 1/28/2009 9:19 AM 
2008:1109 Good Reason to Believe 1155 
CONCLUSION 
Justice Blackmun’s initial ambivalence about granting certiorari in 
Lopez-Mendoza suggests that, in 1984, immigration may not have been 
an overriding concern for the Court or the nation. The situation could 
not be more different today. The majority of new cases filed by federal 
prosecutors in March 2008 were immigration related.276 A 
comprehensive immigration-reform package, described by President 
Bush’s Press Secretary Scott McClellan as a “top priority” in 2006,277 
failed in 2007 after a Senate vote in which, as the Washington Post 
reported, “The most dramatic overhaul of the nation’s immigration 
laws in a generation was crushed . . . in the Senate, with the forces of 
the political right and left overwhelming a bipartisan compromise on 
one of the most difficult issues facing the country.”278 In May 2006, 
hundreds of thousands of protestors marched in demonstrations 
throughout the United States urging immigration reform, including a 
group of about 300,000 people in Chicago and a group of over 400,000 
in Los Angeles.279 In terms of jurisprudence, legislation, and popular 
opinion, immigration enforcement is one of the preeminent issues 
facing America today. 
Immigration law is intimately concerned with human rights and 
human freedom. It is not merely instrumental, but is also expressive 
and self-definitional. As Professor Peter Schuck writes, “[I]mmigration 
law reflects some of our most deeply held values concerning 
community, self-definition, national autonomy, and social justice 
. . . diminution of its legitimacy entails a profound, perhaps 
irretrievable loss.”280 This point is not lost on critics of the current 
immigration regime. A recent editorial in the New York Times 
observed that “the true cost” of constitutional violations occurring in 
the course of immigration-enforcement operations “is to the national 
 
 276. See Preston, supra note 211. 
 277. See Carl Hulse & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators to Reignite Debate on 
Immigration, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2006, at A15. 
 278. Jonathan Weisman, Immigration Bill Dies in Senate, WASH. POST, June 
29, 2007, at A1. In the past three years four major comprehensive immigration-reform 
bills have failed. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th 
Cong.; Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; 
Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005); Border 
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437, 
109th Cong. Three less-than-comprehensive immigration-reform bills have also failed. 
See STRIVE Act of 2007, H.R. 1645, 110th Cong; SKIL Act of 2006, S. 2691, 109th 
Cong.; DREAM Act, S. 1545, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 279. See Thousands March for Immigrant Rights, CNN.COM, May 1, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01/immigrant.day/index.html. 
 280. PETER SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 72 (1998). 
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identity: the sense of who we are and what we value. It will hit us once 
the enforcement fever breaks, when we look at what has been done and 
no longer recognize the country that did it.”281 
In 1984, the Supreme Court held in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza that 
the exclusionary rule need not apply in immigration proceedings. The 
Court reached this decision because it believed that immigration 
proceedings were civil in nature and lacked the harsh penalties of 
criminal law,282 because the immigration service’s internal rules might 
adequately deter Fourth Amendment violations by immigration 
officers,283 and because respondents whose rights were violated could 
seek recompense in civil proceedings.284 However, as this Article has 
demonstrated, in the twenty-five years since Lopez-Mendoza, the legal 
and political landscape has shifted so radically and the situation of 
immigration respondents has changed so markedly that each of these 
three foundational precepts no longer applies. Immigration proceedings 
have become increasingly interwoven with the criminal-law system.285 
ICE officers across the country are disregarding their internal rules and 
engaging in widespread violations of individuals’ constitutional 
rights.286 Those targeted by immigration agents or police officers 
enforcing immigration laws are vulnerable and socially marginalized, 
and therefore highly unlikely to turn to the legal system to seek 
recompense for any wrongs they have suffered.287 As a result, 
constitutional violations by law-enforcement officers have spread 
throughout the nation, growing rapidly in the last two years and 
crossing geographical and institutional boundaries with increasing 
frequency.288 One consequence of this proliferation of constitutional 
violations is that different circuits have adopted divergent approaches to 
the application of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.289 
This circuit split invites the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and 
reconsider the ruling that it made twenty-five years ago in INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza. 
 
 281. Editorial, The Great Immigration Panic, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2008, at 
A22. 
 282. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
 283. Id. at 1045 (commenting that INS rules plainly “require that no one be 
detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested 
unless there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof”) . 
 284. Id. at 1032. But see id. at 1055 (White, J., dissenting); supra Part III.C. 
 285. See supra Part III.A. 
 286. See supra Part III.B. 
 287. See supra Part III.C. 
 288. See supra Part II. 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 190–198. 
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This Article began with Justice Blackmun’s observation that fewer 
than fifty allegations of constitutional violations in twenty-seven years 
probably did not constitute a severe enough problem to warrant the 
Supreme Court granting certiorari. The number of allegations of 
constitutional violations in 2009—crossing geographical and 
institutional boundaries—no longer poses an insignificant problem, but 
rather a widespread problem of exactly the magnitude Justice Blackmun 
and his colleagues had in mind when they joined Part V. Much has 
changed since 1984, but Lopez-Mendoza is still the principal case 
controlling the inclusion or exclusion of evidence in immigration 
proceedings. Applying the principles of Lopez-Mendoza, in light of the 
many changes of the previous twenty-five years—most notably the 
widespread violations of immigration respondents’ constitutional rights, 
the breakdown of the distinction between civil immigration and criminal 
proceedings, the decreased efficacy of ICE’s internal regulations, and 
the diminishing availability of declaratory relief for noncitizens—it is 
now time to revisit the holding of Lopez-Mendoza and reintroduce the 
exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. 
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